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CANONICAL APOSTASIES, AND A WAY
FORWARD FOR THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Kareem Crayton*
Terry Smith**
I. INTRODUCTIONTHE Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder' held that the
targeting formula contained in § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act 2
was invalid because the factors used to identify covered jurisdic-
tions bore no rational relationship to current political conditions. In
reaching this conclusion, a five-justice majority contended that the ex-
traordinary burdens imposed on certain states in 1965 were no longer
tenable since the criteria used in the formula-the use of qualification
tests or devices along with measures of voter registration and turnout-
had ceased to demonstrate significant racial disparities among voters in
these areas.3
The Court's textual or literalist interpretation of § 4(b)'s coverage
formula stands in sharp contrast to the "functionalist" approach to statu-
tory interpretation applied just one term earlier in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,4 involving a requirement in "Obama-
care"5 that individuals purchase health insurance on pain of a penalty,
payable to the Internal Revenue Service. Despite the statute's explicit use
of the term "penalty,"6 and despite its holding that the mandate was not
sustainable under Congress's authority to regulate commerce, the Court
found that the fee was functionally a tax on those who did not purchase
* Associate Professor, University of North Carolina Law School.
** Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul College of Law
1. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973aa-b (2006).
3. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
4. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5. "Obamacare" refers to the informal name used in the press for The Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act. 124 Stat. 119-124 (2013); see also Peter Baker, Democrats
Embrace Once Pejorative 'Obamacare' Tag, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/08/04/health/policy/democrats-embrace-once-pejorative-obamacare-tag.html;
Gregory Wallace, 'Obamacare': The Word that Defined the Healthcare Debate, CNN (June
25, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/25/politics/obamacare-word-debate/index.html.
6. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) ("If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an
applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable . . . fails to meet the requirement of
subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is
hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty . . . .").
3
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health insurance.7 The individual mandate was thus constitutional under
Congress's enumerated power to "lay and collect taxes."8
The Court's functionalist approach to statutory interpretation in Sebe-
lius gave "practical effect to the Legislature's enactment," which left its
core functions intact.9 The Court applied the statutory canon that "if a
statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution,
courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so,"1o even if it is not
the "most natural interpretation," as long as it is a "fairly possible one.""
Ignoring the canonical approach employed in Sebelius, the Court in
Shelby County fixated on the specific wording of § 4(b) while disregard-
ing the very weighty legislative record-including data, court findings,
and witness testimony-that cites current discriminatory conditions
throughout the covered jurisdictions.12 Moreover, the Court's literalist
approach abridged the canon that statutory interpretation is a "holistic
endeavor."' 3 If § 4(b) was read in complete isolation from the remainder
of the statute and totally divorced from the ample legislative record that
demonstrated the ongoing relevance of § 4(b)'s targeting formula, a court
might find that Congress exceeded its enabling authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. However, that crabbed approach seems wholly mis-
placed in Shelby County on its own facts, and it is especially so given the
Court's willingness to see its way to upholding the legislation in Sebelius.
While the Shelby County holding invalidates the targeting formula, it
purports to leave the other provisions of the law intact.14 These provi-
sions include § 5,15 which lays out a covered jurisdiction's obligations to
submit proposed changes to its voting laws and practices for review; § 4's
"bailout" regime,16 which permits a covered jurisdiction to show evidence
that it should be allowed to exit preclearance coverage; and § 3,17 which
authorizes a U.S. District Court to "bail in," or mandate preclearance for
jurisdictions based upon findings of intentional discrimination.
7. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
8. Id. at 2601.
9. Id. at 2598.
10. Id. at 2593.
11. Id. at 2594.
12. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013) ("Coverage today is based
on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula captures States by reference to
literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such
tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in
covered States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided into those with
a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those without
those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the
Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat
it as if it were.").
13. See United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988).
14. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 ("Our decision in no way affects the permanent,
nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2. We issue no holding on § 5
itself, only on the coverage formula.").





Given these provisions, § 4(b)'s coverage formula was sustainable
under a functionalist approach to statutory interpretation. No one doubts
Congress's clear intent to maintain existing protections for minority
groups within these areas,18 and the Court might well have shown regard
for that purpose by applying a functionalist interpretation. If, instead of
reenacting the same coverage formula, Congress had directed, "This sec-
tion [4(b)] shall apply to all jurisdictions currently covered by § 5 that do
not qualify for bailout under § 4(a)," the reasoning in the Shelby County
opinion would be groundless. The hypothesized formula directly relies on
"current conditions" because it relies upon the presently covered jurisdic-
tion's current ability to bail itself out.19 In fact, we contend that this hypo-
thetical formula that would preserve the function of preclearance is
precisely the sum of the mandates contained in §§ 3, 4, and 5-that an
originally covered jurisdiction needs to demonstrate that its inclusion in
the preclearance regime is no longer warranted. The interpretive reason-
ing in Sebelius compels such an approach, yet the Shelby County Court
inexplicably avoids it.
After setting forth the Court's unexplained departure from recent ca-
nonical precedent in Sebelius, we examine the Court's prior treatment of
§ 5 and the Voting Rights Act more broadly. We argue that the trajectory
of the Court's decisions regarding the Act has been in favor of the func-
tionalist approach to statutory interpretation and that when the Court has
departed from this approach, Congress has on numerous occasions
stepped in with a legislative corrective.
An important implication of Shelby County, however, is that the Court
rendered its decision knowing that the political environment of the day
would make it less likely that Congress would fix or overturn the Court's
interpretation. 2 0 Yet, ironically, the Court disclaimed any interest in un-
dermining the legislative authority to enact an alternative version of the
law. This foreseeable congressional inertia has important implications for
separation of powers, the Voting Rights Act, and the enforcement of an-
tidiscrimination laws generally.
First, the juxtaposition of Sebelius and Shelby County leads to a chilling
conclusion about the current Court's view of its role in a democratic sys-
tem. Obamacare was controversial legislation that passed in Congress
18. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(a), 120 Stat. 577,
577 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
19. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
20. Professor Richard Hasen stated that the structure of the Court's holding was
clever but unsurprising, given the justices' keen awareness that suspending the VRA even
on limited grounds would leave a divided Congress unlikely to respond with new legisla-
tion. NPR: Talk of the Nation: What Changes After Supreme Court Ruling on Voting Rights
Act, NPR (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/06/25/195557564/what-
changes-after-supreme-court-ruling-on-voting-rights-act ("This was exactly the decision I
expected, and the reason is that this is a kind of false judicial modesty that we see in this
opinion. Chief Justice Roberts says, well, we're only striking the coverage formula. But the




along strictly partisan lines and continues to divid. the nation. 21 Yet the
Court strained to uphold its essential operating provision, the individual
mandate to purchase health insurance. 22 In contrast, the 2006
reauthorization of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act was passed by large bipar-
tisan majorities in the House and Senate, yet the Court struck down the
statutory provision that identifies states with continuing record evidence
of discrimination for coverage. 23 Without strong reasons, the Court's
holding in Shelby County contravenes the traditional role of the Court in
protecting minorities and cuts against a still extant public sentiment in
favor of the Voting Rights Act.
Second, the Court's decision shifts the focus of voting rights enforce-
ment from a hybrid administrative/litigation model to a purely litigious
model. The latter is bound to be less effective for the very reasons that
Congress anticipated. Litigation is an especially ill-equipped tool to com-
bat the tactical advantages discriminatory jurisdictions enjoy in their abil-
ity to elude judicial edicts by continually replacing existing practices and
procedures found by courts to discriminate with new ones not yet ad-
dressed by past rulings. Moreover, while § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
authorizes claims for vote dilution, which could address some of the is-
sues previously handled administratively under § 5, it is unlikely that § 2
could effectively bear the full weight of the numerous and myriad issues
that § 5 has previously handled.
Third, and relatedly, this view of the ineffectualness of litigation in vot-
ing has, over time, metastasized into a broader skepticism and frustration
about the effectiveness of litigation as a tool for enforcing civil rights
more generally. The channels for seeking redress in the federal courts
have been blocked or narrowed in ways that range from less forgiving
pleading rules to limited opportunities for broad class-based relief. Hav-
ing contributed greatly to that skepticism through rulings on affirmative
21. See U.S. Congress Votes Database, http://www.projects.washingpost.com/Con-
gress/lll/senate/l/votes/396 (Senate vote, 60 Ayes-39 Noes, 58 Democrats and 2 Independ-
ents voting Aye, 39 Republicans voting no, 1 Republican not voting); U.S. Congress
Database, http://www.projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/111/house/2/votes/165 (House
vote 219 Ayes - 212 Noes, 219 Democrats voting Aye, 35 Democrats and 178 Republicans
voting No); Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Oppose Health Law but Like Provisions,
REUTERS (June 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-usa-campaign-
healthcare-id-USBRE85NO1M20120624; Public Approval of Healthcare, REAL CLEAR
POLITICs, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/obamaand democratshealth_
care.plan-1130.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (collection of polls from several polling
services).
22. Sustaining the individual mandate is not the end of the matter. Because the Com-
merce Clause does not support the individual mandate, it is necessary to turn to the Gov-
ernment's second argument: the mandate may be upheld as within Congress's enumerated
power to "lay and collect Taxes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584 (2012); see also Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, The Afford-
able Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. 407 (2011).
23. Stunningly, Justice Scalia stated in oral argument on the Shelby County case that
Congress was solicitous of the Voting Rights Act because it feared being called a racist.
Thus a justice who has insisted that the Court not look beyond the words of a statute for its
meaning purported to plumb the psyches of individual members of Congress. See Tran-
script of Oral Arguments at 46, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
6 [Vol. 67
Unteachable: Shelby County
action, Title VII, and other antidiscrimination issues, the Court in Shelby
County offers little assurance that its approach to the litigation of voting
rights claims will be any different. In all likelihood, these disturbing
trends will be applied by the Roberts Court, leaving a litigation-only vot-
ing rights regime that is far less effective than the system of protections
that Congress overwhelmingly approved.
We conclude our article with a discussion of ways forward for the Vot-
ing Rights Act in light of Shelby County.
II. FUNCTIONALISM, STATUTORY CANONS,
AND APOSTASIES
Shelby County is unteachable as a case about methods of statutory in-
terpretation-it betrays the basic canons the Supreme Court articulated
only a year before eviscerating §§ 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 2 4
At best, the case Gerry-builds a type of entitlement for a state to be in-
formed explicitly by Congress about the bases on which a statutory regu-
lation is to be applied. At worst, Shelby County is an example of what
Justice Ginsburg has accused the Court's conservative majority of both in
her dissenting opinion and in the press-institutional "hubris" 25 and be-
ing "one of the most activist courts in history." 26
To determine which description of the case is more apt, it is important
to understand how Shelby County compares to the Supreme Court's past
treatment of § 5 and the Voting Rights Act. As it turns out, the Court has
fairly consistently employed its functionalist approach (one grounded in
the attention to legislative objectives) to statutory interpretation in a se-
ries of seminal Voting Rights Act cases, even to restrict the scope of the
Act within constitutional bounds. If the Court had emulated the approach
illustrated in Shelby County in these cases, however, both §§ 5 and 2 of
the Voting Rights Act likely would have been declared unconstitutional
well before Shelby County. Moreover, as we demonstrate in this section,
the most significant instances when the Court arguably departed from its
functionalist approach in interpreting the Act were followed by a com-
prehensive repudiation of the Court's decision by Congress.
A. THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH AND RELEVANT CANONS
The functionalist approach to statutory interpretation (also known as
the purposive approach) seeks to comprehend statutory language within
24. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
25. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2648 (2013). (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Leaping to resolve Shelby County's facial challenge without considering whether appli-
cation of the VRA to Shelby County is constitutional, or even addressing the VRA's sever-
ability provision, the Court's opinion can hardly be described as an exemplar of restrained
and moderate decisionmaking. Quite the opposite. Hubris is a fit word for today's demoli-
tion of the VRA.").
26. Adam Liptak, Court Is 'One of Most Activist,' Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.




the context of Congress's goals in passing a specific law.2 7 This interpre-
tive lens authorizes-and at times necessitates-an examination of legis-
lative history to ascertain congressional purpose and thus to correctly
construe the meaning of the words of a statute. 28 The functionalist ap-
proach is in contradistinction to the "plain meaning" or textualist meth-
odology of statutory interpretation. The plain meaning approach allows
reference to external sources to aid in the interpretation of a statute only
when its language is ambiguous.29 To its adherents, the plain meaning
approach avoids the judicial subjectivity inherent in picking and choosing
which parts of a legislative record to accord weight in interpreting a stat-
ute.30 Both interpretative approaches enjoy a long pedigree. 3'
The Court in Sebelius employed the functionalist approach not merely
to ascertain legislative intent but also to uphold a venerated canon of
statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication: "[I]t is well es-
tablished that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which vio-
lates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do
so .... [E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality." 3 2 Thus, while Congress in the
Affordable Care Act described as a "penalty" the amount individuals re-
fusing to purchase health insurance would be required to pay to the U.S.
Treasury, Congress's motivation in requiring the payment was more rele-
vant to the Court's analysis than what the payment was called. Justice
Roberts, the author of Shelby County, wrote for the Court in Sebelius.
Observing that four million people per year were estimated to pay the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rather than purchase insurance pursuant
to individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act, Roberts concluded
"[t]hat Congress apparently regards such extensive failure to comply with
the mandate as tolerable suggests Congress did not think it was creating
four million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility
payment merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu
of buying health insurance." 33 Clearly, a textualist approach would not
have yielded such a conclusion.
In more than four decades of jurisprudence under the Voting Rights
Act, the Court's interpretive approach has been more reminiscent of its
handling of Sebelius than Shelby County. In fact, Shelby County does not
comfortably fit in the textualism camp either because it examined the
coverage formula divorced from the rest of the Voting Right Act's statu-
27. Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds & Andrew M. Murad, A Case Study in
the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth,
64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 224-25 (2012).
28. See id. at 233-34.
29. See id. at 227-28.
30. See id. at 229.
31. See id. at 228, 232.
32. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-94 (2012) (majority
opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 2597.
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tory scheme.3 4 As the most famous textualist alive today, Justice Scalia
has written: "Statutory construction . .. is a holistic endeavor. A provision
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere
in a context that makes its meaning clear . .. or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law."35
Finally, Shelby County betrays yet another interpretive principle by un-
dermining the Court's precedents under the Voting Rights Act: the prin-
ciple of stare decisis.36 While stare decisis is the cornerstone of a
common-law legal regime, "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special
force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the con-
text of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what [the Court does]."37
We characterize the Court's departures from recognized precepts of
statutory interpretation as nothing short of canonical apostasies.
B. THE AFTERMATH OF PASSAGE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS Acr OF 1965
Shelby County's attack on the coverage formula for § 5 bore an unmis-
takable mark of d6jA vu. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,38 South Caro-
lina and other jurisdictions complained that "the coverage formula is
awkwardly designed in a number of respects and that it disregards various
local conditions which have nothing to do with racial discrimination."3 9
The majority in Shelby County similarly found that § 4(b)'s formula
lacked a relationship to current voting discrimination, contending that
Congress simply "reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having
no logical relation to the present day." 4 0 The Court in Shelby County fo-
cused heavily on the supposed staleness of § 4(b)'s criteria-low voter
registration and turnout statistics and the use of tests and devices-vis-A-
vis the second generation voting rights harms that Congress purported to
be addressing (namely vote dilution claims), which the majority described
as "electoral arrangements that affect the weight of-minority votes." 4 1
Although staleness was not at issue in Katzenbach (the first challenge
to § 5 only one year after its enactment in 1965), if that Court had applied
a similarly unforgiving standard as the Court in Shelby County in assess-
ing the fit between the coverage formula and the conditions to which it
34. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
35. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
37. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
38. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
39. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).




was directed, § 5 could well have been doomed in its infancy. There were
undoubtedly more accurate and superior ways of designating jurisdictions
for coverage in 1965 than were enumerated in § 4(b), but for the Katzen-
bach Court, these putative formulations were "largely beside the
point."42 Instead, in a nod to the primacy of legislative intent that the
Court would later embody in Sebelius in its decision on the Affordable
Care Act, the Court in Katzenbach noted that Congress knew from the
outset which states had been guilty of voting discrimination and devised
the coverage formula to fit those states that it wished to capture under§ 5.43
In 2006, when it reauthorized § 5 using essentially the same coverage
formula as in 1965, Congress was aware from a more-than-15,000-page
legislative record of which states were guilty of continuing discrimination
in voting, including so-called second-generation violations. 44 Although
the Court in Shelby County concluded that this extensive record "played
no role in shaping the statutory formula" 45-a conclusion that requires an
assumption that Congress amassed a more-than-15,000-page legislative
record as an act of futility-it is not at all difficult to see how Congress
would have found it efficient and permissible to leave the coverage
formula in place if the original designees were also the worst continuing
violators. Indeed, in the congressional findings made part of the statute
reauthorizing the provision, Congress expressly found a variety of contin-
uing evidence of voting discrimination in the originally covered jurisdic-
tions that rendered racial and language minorities "politically
vulnerable." 46 The Court in Shelby County concluded that evidence does
not look to "current political conditions" because it does not demonstrate
how such discrimination compares to the states "unburdened by cover-
age."47 Katzenbach, however, required no such comparison, nor does the
Court in Shelby County cite authority for imposing this geographically
comparative analysis on the government. It was sufficient in Katzenbach
that Congress "had learned that substantial voting discrimination pres-
ently occurs in certain sections of the country" and that it "chose to limit
its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed nec-
essary."48 To the Court in Katzenbach, it was irrelevant that certain non-
covered jurisdictions may have been discriminating by means that evaded
42. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329.
43. Id. ("Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in
a great majority of the States and political subdivision affected by the new remedies under the
Act. The formula eventually evolved to describe these areas was relevant to the problem of
voting discrimination . . . .") (emphasis added).
44. Kirsten Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act:
How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 385
(2008).
45. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
46. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(6)(3), 120 Stat.
577, 577 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
47. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
48. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
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the sweep of Congress's efforts because "[1legislation need not deal with
all phases of a problem in the same way, so long as the distinctions drawn
have some basis in practical experience." 49 In reauthorizing § 5 and the
existing coverage formula, Congress had concluded from practical experi-
ence that "[t]he continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of
the jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain po-
litically vulnerable, warranting the continued protection of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965."5o
Katzenbach held that the precision of Congress's findings was not a
basis for striking the coverage formula because (1) "Congress is clearly
not bound by the rules relating to statutory presumptions in criminal
cases when it prescribes civil remedies against other organs of govern-
ment under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,"51 and (2) the covered ju-
risdictions at all times remained free to rebut Congress's presumption by
demonstrating under the bailout provision of § 4(a) that they had not
been guilty of recent discrimination in voting. 52 Finally-and perhaps
most importantly because it colors the entirety of the majority's opinion
in Shelby County-although Shelby County sought to elevate the concept
of equal sovereignty among the states to the level of a constitutional
"fundamental principle,"53 the Court in Katzenbach rejected precisely
this state-equal-protection argument because "[t]he doctrine of the equal-
ity of States . .. applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted
to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subse-
quently appeared." 54
Only by clinging to the literal terms of the coverage formula at the
expense of any of the readily available signs about legislative intent-in a
way that it refused to do in Katzenbach and later in Sebelius-does the
Court in Shelby County reach an outcome requiring the invalidation of
the coverage formula.
Three years after Katzenbach, the Court was presented with complex
questions about federal court jurisdiction over suits contesting § 5's cov-
erage and legislative intent regarding the scope of § 5. In Allen v. State
Board of Elections,55 the covered jurisdictions of Mississippi and Virginia
had enacted various modifications to their voting laws without first sub-
mitting them to the United States Attorney General for review or ob-
taining a declaratory judgment from the federal district court for the
49. Id. at 330-31.
50. See Voting Rights Act Reauthorization, § 2(6)(3), 120 Stat. at 577.
51. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330.
52. See id. at 331 ("Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act provides for
termination of special statutory coverage at the behest of States and political subdivisions
in which the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the
preceding five years.")
53. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013).
54. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328-29.
55. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
2014] 11
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District of Columbia. 56 Mississippi and Virginia contended that their vot-
ing modifications, which included a change from district-based to at-large
voting, did not constitute a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" and thus were
not subject to Justice Department or federal court approval under § 5.57
The suit in Allen was brought by private citizens who claimed to be
adversely affected by the states' voting modifications.58 Unlike the Court
in Shelby County, which appeared to accept the legitimacy of regulating
the kinds of voting harms at issue in Allen yet failed to view these harms
as especially relevant in assessing the targeting formula, the Court in Al-
len was of a different mind. In addressing Mississippi's change from dis-
trict to at-large elections for county supervisors, the Court clearly saw § 5
as engineered to address vote dilution: "Voters who are members of a
racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a de-
cided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could there-
fore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would
prohibiting some of them from voting." 59 This reasoning from Allen
makes clear that, even in 1969, second-generation voting discrimination
was part of § 5's ambit in regulating the states identified by the very same
formula that the Court in Shelby County deems blind to second-genera-
tion voting harms.60 Based on its earliest reauthorizations of § 5 using the
56. See id. at 550.
57. See id. at 563.
58. See id. at 554.
59. See id. at 569.
60. See also Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971) (holding that the city of
Canton, Mississippi, was required to subject for Justice Department or D.C. District Court
review changes in boundary lines by annexations because such a change "dilutes the weight
of the votes of voters to whom the franchise was limited before the annexation, and 'the
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.'" (citations
omitted)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534 (1973) (concluding that, regarding
Georgia's failure to submit its redistricting for approval by the Attorney General under
§ 5, "the question is not whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including exten-
sive shifts from single-member to multimember districts, in fact had a racially discrimina-
tory purpose or effect. The question, rather, is whether such changes have the potential for
diluting the value of the Negro vote and are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is
beyond doubt that such a potential exists." (citations omitted)); Morris v. Gressette, 432
U.S. 491, 496 n.4 (1977) (The Court reviewed the Attorney General's failure to object to a
South Carolina state senate reapportionment plan that featured multimember districts,
numbered posts, and a majority (run-off) requirement that the Attorney General believed
would abridge minority voting rights).
The Court in Perkins quoted with approval the following language from a study by the
United States Civil Rights Commission that underscored that registration and access to the
polls were just the beginning of the battle to eliminate voting discrimination in the covered
jurisdictions because "gerrymandering and boundary changes had become prime weapons
for discriminating against Negro voters:
The history of white domination in the South has been one of adaptiveness,
and the passage of the Voting Rights Acts and the increased black registra-
tion that followed has resulted in new methods to maintain white control of
the political process.
For example, State legislatures and political party committees in Alabama
and Mississippi have adopted laws or rules since the passage of the act which
have had the purpose or effect of diluting the votes of newly enfranchised
12 [Vol. 67
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original coverage predicates, Congress was clearly aware that "[a]s regis-
tration and voting of minority citizens increases [sic], other measures may
be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength." 6 1
In light of the contemporaneous period that illustrates the enacting Con-
gress's intent, the Court in Shelby County simply cannot be right in deem-
ing the original coverage formula an irrational means of addressing new
types of voting wrongs that were likely to emerge-and indeed have
emerged-in originally covered jurisdictions.
Allen denudes other errors in Shelby County's interpretative approach
as well. Before the Court in Allen could address the plaintiffs' claims, it
had to resolve whether Congress intended to confer a private right of
action under § 5 and whether a federal district court other than the dis-
trict court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to issue a declara-
tory judgment or injunction in a suit based on § 5.62 The Court's
disposition of these preliminary matters in Allen brings into further relief
the Court's begrudging treatment of § 4(b) in Shelby County. While ac-
knowledging that the Voting Rights Act did not explicitly address the
question, the Court in Allen found a private right of action by reading § 5
Negro voters. These measures have taken the form of switching to at-large
elections where Negro voting strength is concentrated in particular election
districts, facilitating the consolidation of predominantly Negro and predomi-
nantly white counties, and redrawing the lines of districts to divide concen-
trations of Negro voting strength.
Perkins, 400 U.S. at 389 (citations omitted). The majority in Shelby County ignores alto-
gether cases such as Perkins in concluding that "[v]iewing the preclearance requirement as
targeting [second-generation barriers] highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on
the § 4 coverage formula, which is based on voting test and access to the ballot, not vote
dilution." Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013). If the formula is irrational
today, however, it was also irrational shortly after the passage of the Voting Rights Act
because that is when § 5 began to be employed against the originally covered jurisdictions
to combat the very second-generation voting barriers that the Court in Shelby County in-
sisted have no relationship to the coverage formula.
Shelby County gets it wrong by, among other errors, inexplicably attempting to imbue the
coverage formula in § 4(b) with a precise, imbricated relationship to the substantive evils
that § 5 has proven capable of combatting. Cases such Allen and Perkins demonstrate the
folly of any such requirement. These cases document that even as the coverage formula
remained static, the covered jurisdictions themselves engage in dynamic, transmuting
schemes to blunt the effects of allowing black voters to register and vote. If the coverage
formula had to change to reflect the myriad evils that covered jurisdictions might eventu-
ally conceive and perpetrate, § 5 would have been a nullity almost from its inception be-
cause "[t]he history of white domination in the South has been one of adaptiveness . . .
Perkins, 400 U.S. at 389 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
61. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 181 (1980) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
94-196, at 10-11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, which involved a seven-year
extension of § 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Allen, 393 U.S. at 557 ("We have previously held that a federal statute passed to
protect a class of citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the protected
class to institute suit, nevertheless implied a private right of action ..... We held that
'[wihile this language makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its
chief purposes is "the protection of investors," which certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.' A similar analysis is applicable here.
The guarantee of § 5 that no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply
with an unapproved new enactment subject to § 5, might well prove an empty promise




"in light of the major purpose of the Act."63 According to the Court,
given the limited resources of the Justice Department, "[i]t is consistent
with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing
to insure that his city or county government complies with the § 5 ap-
proval requirements." 64 Had the Court in Shelby County similarly read
§ 4(b) in light of the major purpose of the Voting Rights Act, it could not
have reasonably concluded, given the success of the Act, that § 4(b)'s
coverage formula was unrelated to the harms that Congress intended to
combat. To so conclude is to suggest that the Act's success, which the
Shelby County Court itself readily acknowledged, 65 has been a fluke, ow-
ing nothing to the very statutory design that the Court upends by striking
down § 4(b).
Allen provides one other lesson in functionalist-and hence, rational-
statutory interpretation. In addressing the question of whether plaintiffs
could have pursued their claim in a federal district court outside of the
District of Columbia, the Court again declined to read the Voting Rights
Act's provisions in isolation.66 This holistic reading led the Court to reject
Mississippi and Virginia's contention that a plaintiff seeking to compel
compliance with the review process had to commence an action in the
District of Columbia. The Court coupled its imbricated statutory analysis
with "strong reasons for adoption of this interpretation," 67 which were
focused on the plaintiff's burdens. "The individual litigant will often not
have sufficient resources to maintain an action easily outside the district
in which he resides, especially in cases where the individual litigant is
attacking a local city or county regulation." 68
In other cases interpreting § 5, the Court has emphasized that "it is
important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5"69 and that there exists an
"explicit textual relationship between § 4 and § 5."o7 This common-sense
approach to statutory interpretation is nowhere evident in the majority's
63. Id. at 555.
64. Id. at 556-57. Other early § 5 cases similarly sought to effectuate the broad pur-
poses of the Voting Rights Act when presented with a question that the Voting Rights Act
did not explicitly address. See, e.g., Gressette, 432 U.S. at 505 (finding that, despite the
absence of express statutory guidance, the Voting Rights Act did not allow private plain-
tiffs to file suit contesting the Attorney General's failure to object to a voting change under
§ 5 because "[i]n light of the potential severity of the § 5 remedy, the statutory language,
and the legislative history, we think it clear that Congress intended to provide covered
jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions").
65. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) ("The Act has proved
immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting
process.").
66. See, e.g., Allen, 393 U.S. at 558 ("Section 14(b) must be read with the Act's other
enforcement provisions.").
67. Id. at 559.
68. Id. at 560.
69. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973).
70. See United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 128 (1978)
(addressing §§ 4 and 5 in the context of determining whether a political subdivision that
did not register voters was nevertheless required to submit changes in voting procedures
for preclearance by the Attorney General).
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opinion in Shelby County.7' There, the Court trained its attention exclu-
sively on the coverage formula to the exclusion of § 4(a) of the Act,
which allows covered states no longer guilty of recent discrimination to
bail out of § 5's requirements. 72 The majority likewise ignored § 2 of the
Act, which prohibits vote dilution and applies nationwide, and § 3, which
allows the Justice Department to seek to bail in an uncovered jurisdiction
that has been found guilty of intentional discrimination.73
The absurdity of the Court's fragmentary approach to statutory con-
struction in Shelby County is highlighted by its sophistic assertion that its
decision regarding the coverage formula did not effectively gut § 5's
preclearance provisions: "We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the
coverage formula." 74 Yet, the Court had in the past been quite clear that
"§ 5 was structured to assure the effectiveness of the dramatic step that
Congress had taken in § 4 and is clearly designed to march in lock-step
with § 4."75 In short, neither traditional methods of statutory construction
nor the Court's own § 5 precedents supports Shelby County's piecemeal
handling of the coverage formula in § 4(b).
Pivoting from the coverage formula, the substantive requirements of
§ 5 itself were at issue in Beer v. United States,76 and the Court again set
about the task of discerning legislative intent when it could have em-
braced literalism.77 Section 5 prohibits covered jurisdictions from imple-
71. Contra Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632-33 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id. at 2629 ("We cannot pretend that we are reviewing an updated statute, or try
our hand at updating the statute ourselves, based on the new record compiled by Congress.
Contrary to the dissent's contention, we are not ignoring the record; we are simply recog-
nizing that it played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us today.").
73. Id. at 2619 ("Inspired to action by the civil rights movement, Congress responded
in 1965 with the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 was enacted to forbid, in all 50 States, any
'standard, practice, or procedure ... imposed or applied ... to deny or abridge the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.' The current version
forbids any 'standard, practice, or procedure' that 'results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.' Both the
Federal Government and individuals have sued to enforce Section 2, and injunctive relief is
available in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going into effect. Section 2 is
permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case." (citations omitted)).
As does the bailout provision, the nationwide applicability of §§ 2 and 3 directly addresses
the Court's purported concern with equal treatment of states. Non-covered jurisdictions
were not given a pass under the Voting Rights Act, although their discrimination in voting
was addressed differently than that of jurisdictions with the worst histories of voting dis-
crimination. Unless the Shelby County majority is prepared to fashion a rule of exactitude
in congressional treatment of the states, there is no principled limitation to the approach
adopted by the majority.
74. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
75. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. at 122 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
76. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
77. Id. at 139-40 ("A determination of when a legislative reapportionment has 'the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,' must depend,
therefore, upon the intent of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act and specifically
§ 5. The legislative history reveals that the basic purpose of Congress in enacting the Vot-
ing Rights Act was 'to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.' Section 5 was
intended to play an important role in achieving that goal: 'Section 5 was a response to a
common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by
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menting voting procedures or qualifications that "have the purpose ...
[or] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color ... ."78 Because § 5's prohibition mirrors the Fifteenth's Amend-
ment proscription against voting discrimination, 79 Justice Marshall con-
tended that § 5's "'denying or abridging' phrase does no more than
directly adopt the language of the Fifteenth Amendment."80
The majority in Beer, however, declined to follow Justice Marshall's in
pari materia approach to interpreting § 5. It instead discerned a legislative
intent from its review of the congressional record to limit the scope of
§ 5's prohibition to voting changes "that would lead to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise." 8' Although not categorically so, Justice Mar-
shall's dissent was textualist, while the majority's approach to statutory
interpretation was more akin to the functionalist variety seen in Sebe-
lius. 8 2 The Court was guided by its understanding of the goals that Con-
gress intended to accomplish, importing new concepts that would work
consistent with that purpose.83 We do not mean to suggest that one ap-
proach versus the other commends the actual holding in Beer. Nor, for
that matter, is our objective in this article to explain Shelby County as a
liberal or conservative decision. The point, instead, is that viewed in com-
parison to the majority's approach in Beer-which involved searching for
congressional intent beyond the literal terms of § 5-Shelby County is
methodologically unmoored from precedent and thus unteachable as ei-
ther a canonical statutory interpretation decision or as progeny of the
Court's Voting Rights Act jurisprudence. It is an estranged decision that
lends itself to popular caricatures of high-court politicization precisely be-
cause it inexplicably dashes the approach that the Court undertook in its
earliest decisions interpreting § 5 and the coverage formula of § 4(b).
C. MODERN § 5 CASES
More recent § 5 cases cast Shelby County in no better light than the
Court's earlier precedents. Even as it reached controversial conclusions
regarding the scope of § 5, the Court's decisions were not susceptible to
passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down. That
practice had been possible because each new law remained in effect until the Justice De-
partment or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the burden of proving that the new law,
too, was discriminatory.' . . . Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it
could, 'to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its
victim,' by 'freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be
shown to be nondiscriminatory."' (citations omitted)).
78. Id. at 132.
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
80. Beer, 425 U.S. at 148-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 141.
82. Compare id. at 148-155 (Marshall, J., dissenting), with id. at 139-42 (majority
opinion), and Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-94 (2012).
83. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 139-40.
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the charge of fragmentary statutory analysis that disserves legislative pur-
pose, as is Shelby County. Thus, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board
("Bossier Parish I"),84 the Court contemplated the relationship between
§ 5 and § 2 and whether a clear violation of the latter-i.e., a finding of
vote dilution-was a basis for interposing an objection under the former,
which required only retrogression of the minority group's position vis-A-
vis the prior plan to which a proposed change is compared.85 Writing for
the majority, Justice O'Connor arguably demonstrated fidelity to stare
decisis in holding that the retrogression standard announced in Beer con-
trolled the decision in Bossier 1.86 Noting that requiring covered jurisdic-
tions to satisfy the standards of § 2 would "impose a demonstrably
greater burden"87 than those entities previously had to satisfy under the
retrogression standard of Beer, the Court viewed its holding as consonant
with congressional intent because Congress had declined to amend the
longstanding Beer standard when it reauthorized § 5.88 Consistent with
our view of Beer, we do not claim that the Court's approach to interpret-
ing § 5 commends the result it reaches in Bossier Parish I. It is undenia-
ble, however, that the Court's approach to statutory interpretation in that
case features recognized elements of functionalist statutory construction
and the application of traditional canons, including: (1) respect for stare
decisis, (2) a holistic reading of the statute that attempts to give practical
effect to each of its parts, and (3) an effort to reconcile its reading of the
statute with legislative intent.89
84. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
85. Id. at 487-88 ("In fact, we have previously observed that a jurisdiction's single
decision to choose a redistricting plan that has a dilutive impact does not, without more,
suffice to establish that the jurisdiction acted with a discriminatory purpose. This is true
whether the jurisdiction chose the more dilutive plan because it better comported with its
traditional districting principles, or if it chose the plan for no reason at all. Indeed, if a
plan's dilutive impact were dispositive, we would effectively incorporate § 2 into § 5, which
is a result we find unsatisfactory no matter how it is packaged.").
86. Id. at 478.
87. Id. at 484.
88. Id. at 483-84.
89. See also Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (holding that a state
political party's decision to require payment of a registration fee to become a delegate to
the party's convention to nominate a candidate for the United States Senate required
preclearance under § 5). The question in Morse was whether a political party in a covered
jurisdiction that changed its party nominating rules was subject to preclearance in the same
way a covered state or political subdivision would be if it had made such a change.
After concluding that political parties in Virginia act under color of state law when they
select nominees for the general election, see id. at 194, the Court addressed whether § 5
covered the party's imposition of a filing fee for delegates to its convention. The Court first
noted that it had "consistently construed the Act to require preclearance of any change in
procedures or practices that may bear on the 'effectiveness of a vote cast in 'any primary,
special, or general election"' Id. at 205. It then determined that the filing fee was the kind
of "prerequisite to voting" comprehended by § 5 because "[d]elegate qualifications are in
fact more closely tied to the voting process than practices that may cause vote dilution,
whose coverage under § 5 we have repeatedly upheld." Id. at 207. The Court also noted
that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act encompasses by its own terms "the political processes
leading to nomination or election." Id. at 209. This finding was important to the Court's
decision because "changes in practices within covered jurisdictions that would be poten-
tially objectionable under § 2 are also covered under § 5." Id. at 209-10. Finally, the Court
2014] 17
SMU LAW REVIEW
As discussed in Part I.A, Shelby County contorts and ignores the
Court's § 5 precedents to fit a contrived conception of equal sovereignty
among states for which the majority lacks direct case authority. 90 Unlike
the Court's attempt in Bossier Parish I to give effect to and harmonize
both §§ 5 and 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court in Shelby County
wholly detaches the bailout provisions in § 4 from its consideration of
whether the coverage formula addresses "current need" or "current polit-
ical conditions." 9' A demonstration of the absence of recent discrimina-
tion in a covered jurisdiction is a current condition that frees it from the
coverage formula. Finally, Shelby County's treatment of legislative his-
tory is highly unusual. The majority concludes that Congress's extensive
documentation of racially polarized voting and continuing discrimination
in covered jurisdictions "played no role in shaping the statutory
formula."92 Setting to one side that the majority's conclusion seems flatly
contradicted by the congressional findings that preamble the 2006
reauthorization of § 5, we are simply unaware of any precept of statutory
interpretation that allows a court to disengage the legislative history of
statutory language by blithely discounting Congress's reliance on that his-
tory.93 In Sebelius, Congress expressly said it was imposing a "penalty" on
individuals who failed to purchase health insurance, yet to avoid declar-
ing an act of Congress unconstitutional, the Court searched for what Con-
considered application of § 5 to the convention filing fee in light of the history that led to
passage of the Voting Rights Act.
Morse, then, is emblematic of the functionalist and canon-abiding interpretive approach
that the Court has largely followed in its § 5 jurisprudence. On the other hand, we must
acknowledge that some of the Court's § 5 cases do not easily fit the topology we have set
forth in this Article. Arguably, Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (1992),
is one such case. In Presley, the plaintiffs sought enforcement of § S's preclearance provi-
sion for changes that reduced the authority of local commissioners after black people had
been elected to the county commissions in Etowah County and Russell County. A six-
justice majority found that by its terms § 5 did not cover modifications in the organization
of government. Instead, preclearance was required only for any "voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." Id. at
504. One could read Presley as a "plain meaning" case which admits of no further complex-
ity. On the other hand, the Court's decision was born of a perceived need to "formulate
workable rules to confine the coverage of § 5 to its legitimate sphere: voting." Id. at 506.
Arguably, then, Presley is functionalist and canon-abiding to the degree that the Court's
interpretation was intended to preserve § 5's constitutionality.
90. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2012) ("We explained that § 5 'im-
poses substantial federalism costs' and 'differentiates between the States, despite our his-
toric tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty."' (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009))).
91. Id. at 2628-29.
92. Id. at 2629.
93. Id. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[L]egislation reauthorizing an existing stat-
ute is especially likely to satisfy the minimal requirements of the rational-basis test. First,
when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already assembled a legislative record justi-
fying the initial legislation. Congress is entitled to consider that preexisting record as well
as the record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization. This is especially true
where, as here, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the statute's constitutionality and Con-
gress has adhered to the very model the Court has upheld (citation omitted) ("The appel-
lants are asking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach . . . in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act.")").
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gress reasonably could have meant. 94 In contrast, in Shelby County, the
majority deemed any such exercise as tantamount to "try[ing] our hand at
updating the statute ourselves." 95 Surely enough, however, updating or
rewriting the penalty provision of the Affordable Care Act is precisely
what the dissent accused the Court of doing in Sebelius. Writing for the
dissent, Justice Scalia explained, "The issue is not whether Congress had
the power to frame the minimum-coverage provision as a tax, but
whether it did so."96 In his view, Congress most assuredly did not exercise
its taxing powers. 97
The fundamental inconsistency between Sebelius and Shelby County,
separated by only a year, is made more apparent in comparing Shelby
County with the identical constitutional issue raised in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder.98 In Austin, decided a mere
four years before the Court effectively invalidated § 5, the Court strove
mightily to give the entire statutory scheme of § 5 a savings construction
that would render it constitutional.9 9 As a political subdivision in a cov-
ered state-Texas-the plaintiff utility district in Austin was required to
seek preclearance under § 5 before making changes to the manner in
which it elected its board. 100 The utility district, however, sought relief
from this obligation under the bailout provisions of § 4.101 A district court
denied the utility district bailout on the ground that the utility district was
not a "political subdivision" for bailout purposes under § 4(a) because it
did not register its own voters.102 In overturning the district court's deci-
sion, Justice Roberts set forth interpretive criteria that he failed to apply
in Shelby County: "[H]ere specific precedent, the structure of the Voting
Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a broader
reading of the bailout provision." 03 Moreover, in contrast to its singular
focus on the coverage formula in Shelby County, the Court refused to
consider § 4(a)'s bailout provisions "in isolation from the rest of the stat-
ute and our prior cases."104
94. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) (stating that
"[t]here is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to 'any tax' would apply to
a 'penalty"'- ultimately concluding that the penalty is equivalent to a tax).
95. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
96. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
99. Id. at 205. ("We will not shrink from our duty 'as the bulwar[k] of a limited consti-
tution against legislative encroachments,' but '[i]t is a well-established principle governing
the prudent exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case[.]'
Here, the district also raises a statutory claim that it is eligible to bail out under §§ 4 and
5." (citations omitted)).
100. See id. at 196.
101. See id. at 197 ("[The bailout] provision allows the release of a "political subdivi-
sion" from the preclearance requirements if certain rigorous conditions are met.").
102. Id. at 200-01.




The constitutional concerns that drove the Court's analysis in Austin
were the federalism concerns that formed the sword on which the Court
would eventually hoist § 5 and its coverage formula. Despite its pur-
ported federalism concerns, the Court in Austin spoke only broadly of
"our historic tradition that all States enjoy 'equal sovereignty"' and at no
point did the Court cite a specific precedent holding that this tradition-
which it a short while later equates to a "fundamental principle"-ap-
plied beyond the point at which states are admitted to the Union.105 In
seeming deference to Katzenbach, the Court acknowledged this limita-
tion on equal sovereignty of the states, but then, with no citation at all, it
concluded that a departure from equal treatment of the states "requires a
showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently re-
lated to the problem it targets."1 06
Notwithstanding the doctrinally unsubstantiated nature of the federal-
ism concerns raised in Austin, the Court's application of the principle of
constitutional avoidance meant that nothing turned on these concerns. By
viewing the Voting Rights Act in its entirety rather than looking at the
bailout provisions in isolation, the Court found that "political subdivi-
sion" did not have a constant meaning throughout the Act.107 Moreover,
the Court actually examined legislative history with a view toward con-
struing the term "political subdivision" in § 4 consistently with Congress's
intent in the 1982 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act.108 The Court
acted with an understanding that "Congress is a coequal branch of gov-
ernment whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the Consti-
tution of the United States," and thus "normally the Court will not decide
a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to
dispose of the case." 109
105. Id. at 203. The Court cites United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960), in
which the Court was determining a territorial dispute between the United States and vari-
ous states, and the Court wrote as follows: "This Court early held that the 13 original
States, by virtue of the sovereignty acquired through revolution against the Crown, owned
the lands beneath navigable inland waters within their territorial boundaries, and that each
subsequently admitted State acquired similar rights as an inseparable attribute of the equal
sovereignty guaranteed to it upon admission." Id. Nothing in the Court's statement sug-
gests an extension of the principle of equal sovereignty beyond the point of admission to
the United States. The Court also cited to Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), a case deter-
mining the effect of an attempted secession by Texas. The Court in Austin does not specify
which language in White it is relying on for the proposition that states enjoy equal sover-
eignty, but the only relevant language from that case appears to be this: "Not only, there-
fore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through
their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preserva-
tion of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the de-
sign and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of
the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States." Id. at 726. This elliptical language, however,
does not directly address the question of whether and to what degree states must be
treated equally.
106. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
107. Id. at 208.
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id. at 204-05.
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These separation of power concerns, and the interpretive approach
which facilitates them, literally disappear in Shelby County. In fact, one
might observe that out of a purported concern with § 5's high federalism
costs, the majority in Shelby County exacts a corresponding toll on the
separation of powers doctrine. Had the Court in Shelby County viewed
the coverage formula through the prism of the very bailout provision that
proved pivotal in forestalling a constitutional ruling in Austin, it would
have not been possible to argue that § 4(b)'s coverage formula does not
look to current conditions. That is because the bailout provision makes
express reference to the ten years preceding a covered jurisdiction's suit
to bailout.110 If the applicant has not used a voting test or device, has not
been the subject of any lawful objection under § 5, has not been found
liable for voting rights violations, and has otherwise attempted to prevent
the intimidation or harassment of voters, the coverage formula ceases to
apply. In short, § 4(a) updates the coverage formula as covered jurisdic-
tions' conduct changes. This holistic view of the coverage formula is en-
tirely consistent with the Court's reading of it in Katzenbach, in which the
Court observed that Congress "[a]cknowledged the possibility of over-
reach" by "provid[ing] for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which the danger of sub-
stantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the preceding
five years."'11
In Shelby County, however, Justice Roberts writes for the majority as if
it actually decided the constitutional issue in Austin and the Congress
simply failed to heed its ruling: "[I]n issuing [Austin], we expressed our
broader concern about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could
have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its
failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) uncon-
stitutional." 112 If the Court's intention in Austin was to spur Congress to
action, it could have said so at the time. Justice Ginsburg, for instance,
showed no hesitation in inviting congressional action in the context of the
Court's ruling on a Title VII pay discrimination claim: "This is not the
first time the Court has ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII,
incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose. Once again, the
ball is in Congress' court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct
this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII."11 3 We do not understand
the separation of powers doctrine to prohibit this kind of dialogue be-
110. Id. at 199 ("To bail out under the current provision, a jurisdiction must seek a
declaratory judgment from a three-judge District Court in Washington, D.C. It must show
that for the previous 10 years it has not used any forbidden voting test, has not been sub-
ject to any valid objection under § 5, and has not been found liable for other voting rights
violations; it must also show that it has 'engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimi-
dation and harassment' of voters, and similar measures.").
111. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966).
112. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
113. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007), overruled by
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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tween coequal branches of government. Nor, for that matter, would it
have been inappropriate for the Court in either Austin or Shelby County
to have given more specific guidance regarding what would be an accept-
able coverage formula. Indeed, if the majority in Austin meant what it
said about Congress's authority relative to its own,1 14 it may have even
been appropriate for the Court in Shelby County to have stayed its ruling
pending Congress's revision of the coverage formula.
The interpretive approach applied by the majority in Shelby County is
similar to the approach taken in two major § 5 cases in which Congress
chose to correct the Court's construction of that provision. It is the odd
case in which one Justice disapprovingly accuses another of "embark[ing]
upon a lengthy expedition into legislative history[,]" yet Justice Scalia
made such a claim in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish
II).115 Bossier Parish II answered a question left open by Bossier Parish I:
Does a discriminatory purpose bar preclearance under Section 5 or is ret-
rogressive intent was needed? Bossier Parish I held that compliance with§ 2's vote dilution prohibition was not necessary for preclearance under
§ 5, but the Court deemed dilutive impact as probative of a discrimina-
tory purpose. 1 1 6 It remanded Bossier Parish I to the district court to de-
termine whether the parish's redistricting for its twelve-member Police
Jury was performed with a discriminatory purpose, contrary to § 5's in-
struction that a change is to be precleared only if it "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color."' 17
The district court did not find a discriminatory purpose.118 On appeal
to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that
like the "effect" prong of § 5, the "purpose" prong applies only to retro-
gressive purpose-in this case, an intent to render a minority group worse
off than they were under a prior baseline redistricting plan. 119 Because
the parish's previous redistricting contained no majority black districts,
and its proposed new plan contained none, there was no evidence of a
retrogressive purpose, even if there may have been evidence of a discrim-
inatory purpose. 120 To reach the conclusion that § 5 prohibits retrogres-
114. Austin, 557 U.S. at 205-06 ("We will not shrink from our duty 'as the bulwar[k] of
a limited constitution against legislative encroachments,' THE FEDERALIST No. 78, p. 526
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton), but '[i]t is a well-established principle governing the
prudent exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a con-
stitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case . . .
(citations omitted)).
115. 528 U.S. 320, 335 n.4 (2000).
116. Id. at 325.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(a) (2006).
118. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 326.
119. Id. at 328.
120. Id. at 340 ("Appellants assert that we must have viewed the city's purpose as dis-
criminatory but nonretrogressive because, as the city noted in contending that it lacked
even a discriminatory purpose, the city could not have been acting to worsen the voting
strength of any present black residents, since there were no black voters at the time. How-
ever ... we did not hold that the purpose prong of § 5 extends beyond retrogression, but
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sive rather than discriminatory purpose, Justice Scalia first had to
circumvent two decisions in which the Court had in fact given the pur-
pose prong of § 5 a broader meaning.121 He also had to dismiss as dictum
the Court's statement in Beer that "an ameliorative new legislative appor-
tionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so dis-
criminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." 12 2
The plaintiffs in Bossier II had alleged just such a constitutional violation.
Finally, Justice Scalia was compelled to dismiss Justice Souter's examina-
tion of legislative history "since [Souter] can point to nothing suggesting
that the Congress thought § 5 covered both retrogressive and nonre-
trogressive dilution."123 Yet Justice Souter maintained that "the whole
point of the legislative history is that Congress meant to guard against
just those discriminatory devices that were as yet untried. Congress did
not know what the covered jurisdictions would think up next."124 Thus,
according to Justice Souter, Congress in § 5 was concerned with "[a]ny
purpose to give less weight to minority participation in the electoral pro-
cess than to majority participation."12 5
Congress agreed. In its 2006 reauthorization of § 5, Congress repudi-
ated Justice Scalia's approach to interpreting the purpose prong of § 5,
clarifying that "[t]he term 'purpose' in subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion shall include any discriminatory purpose." 126 Unchastened by Con-
gress's rejection of its cramped reading of § 5 in Bossier Parish II, the
Court in Shelby County treated Congress's 2006 clarification not as a pre-
cautionary tale that it should not narrowly construe the coverage formula,
but rather as "exacerbat[ing] the substantial federalism costs that [the]
preclearance procedure already exacts ... . "127 Nothing about federalism
privileges a state to implement racially discriminatory voting changes.128
Presumably, in the absence of § 5, plaintiffs in a voting rights case could
seek preliminary relief from the implementation of such changes, and
that too would entail costs to federalism. No one, however, doubts a fed-
eral court's authority to enjoin such changes, so it is puzzling that, in the
Court's view, Congress, which is given express remedial authority to pre-
vent voting discrimination in § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, cannot do
the same without running afoul of federalism.129
rather held that a jurisdiction with no minority voters can have a retrogressive purpose, at
the present time, by intending to worsen the voting strength of future minority voters.").
121. See id. at 330, 339.
122. Id. at 337-38 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
123. Id. at 335 n.4.
124. Id. at 367 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id.
126. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 581
(2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
127. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626-27 (2013).





In the very same 2006 reauthorization of § 5, Congress also expressed
its disapproval of the Supreme Court's interpretation of that provision in
Georgia v. Ashcroft.o30 In Ashcroft, "the state of Georgia had sought
preclearance of its state senate redistricting plan" by a three-judge fed-
eral district court in the District of Columbia.131 The district court denied
preclearance, finding retrogression in three majority-minority senate dis-
tricts in which the percentage of voting-age African Americans had been
reduced and thus diminishing their voting strength.132 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice O'Connor held that the relevant standard-whether there
has been "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise"-required an assess-
ment of the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to the
minority group's ability to elect the candidate of its choice.133 The Court
gave no indication of how this malleable standard of retrogression, which
looked at such factors as whether a redistricting plan would enable a mi-
nority-preferred candidate to be reelected and to ascend to the ranks of
legislative leadership, could possibly be applied by a district court or the
Attorney General.134 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that the majority's
construction left § 5 "practically unadministrable."1 35 Moreover, the stan-
dard was unmoored from the Court's precedents under § 5, and contrary
to Justice O'Connor's own admonitions about the distinct functions of
§§ 5 and 2 in Bossier Parish I, her analysis borrowed heavily from § 2
cases. 136 Moreover, the majority made no attempt to reconcile its con-
struction with legislative intent.137 Just as its interpretative approach was
identical to Bossier Parish II, so too did Ashcroft meet the same fate in
Congress. In its 2006 reauthorization of § 5, Congress clarified that "[t]he
purpose of subsection (b) of [§ 5] is to protect the ability of such citizens
to elect their preferred candidates of choice."' 38
D. SUMMARY: § 5 CASES
We have argued that, on the whole, in interpreting § 5, the Court's
methodology has been more akin to Sebelius and a functionalist approach
than to the sui generis tact taken by the majority in Shelby County. On
the two significant occasions where the Court's interpretation of § 5 has
veered distinctly from a functionalist, canon-faithful approach, Congress
has overturned its decisions. Shelby County likely will mark the third such
notable occasion, except that in disabling § 5 by declaring § 4(b)'s cover-
130. 539 U.S. 461 (2003); see Pub. L. 109-246, § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. at 578.
131. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 461.
132. Id. at 474-75.
133. Id. at 477-80.
134. Id. at 484-85.
135. Id. at 493-94 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., id. at 479-80, 482-86.
137. Id. at 463-91.
138. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5(3)(d), 120 Stat.
577, 581 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
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age formula unconstitutional, the majority in Shelby County knowingly
lateraled an issue to Congress that the present Congress is likely politi-
cally incapable of resolving. Before addressing the implications of this in
Part II, we briefly examine the Court's treatment of § 2 cases to discern
whether the trajectory of its decisions parallels the overarching interpre-
tative approach in its § 5 cases.
E. § 2 CASES
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 presented a learning curve
for the Supreme Court. Whereas the Court began its construction of § 5
of the Act with the capaciousness needed to carry out Congress's goal of
eradicating discrimination in voting, it did precisely the opposite with § 2.
In City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden,139 black citizens sued, alleging that
Mobile's at-large scheme for electing its commissioners violated the Fif-
teenth Amendment and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.140 Justice Stewart,
the author of the Beer decision limiting the effects prong of § 5 to retro-
gression, wrote for the plurality. The Court held that "the language of § 2
no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the
sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have
an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."141
Because the Fifteenth Amendment required a showing of discriminatory
intent, the Court found that § 2 likewise required such a demonstra-
tion.142 Justice Stewart read § 2's prohibition on electoral rules that "deny
or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color" in pari materia with the Fifteenth Amendment's com-
mand that the right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged . . . on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."143 This
represented a reversal for him and the Court. Over Justice Marshall's dis-
sent arguing that the scope of § 5 was coterminous with the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Court in Beer declined to read § 5's standard-"does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color"-in pari materia with the
Fifteenth Amendment's language that the right to vote "shall not be de-
nied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."144 Moreover, the majority in Bolden never explained why
Congress would simply recodify the command of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in § 2 when a private right of action already existed under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. Unlike § 5, which, among other things, shifted the
burden of proof to defendants and therefore augmented the Fifteenth
139. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
140. Id. at 58.
141. Id. at 60-61.
142. Id. at 62-63.
143. Id. at 60-62.
144. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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Amendment's proscription,145 a mere recodification of the Fifteenth
Amendment in § 2 was superfluous. Thus, in addition to not adhering to
precedent, the Court in Bolden did not give a practical interpretation to
§ 2.
Congress acted swiftly to "dispositively reject[ ] the position of the plu-
rality in [Bolden], which required proof that the contested electoral prac-
tice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to
discriminate against minority voters."146 In adopting an "effects test" for
vote dilution under § 2, however, Congress left important questions unan-
swered.147 These questions, depending on the interpretive method em-
ployed by the Court, could well have called into question the revised
section's constitutionality. In Thornburg v. Gingles, a case challenging a
multimember (at-large) districting system for the North Carolina legisla-
ture, the Court began its review of the revised § 2 with a thorough vetting
of its legislative history.148 The Court understood the legislative record to
require a "functionalist" view of political processes and their relationship
to § 2.149 This understanding was particularly important given the Court's
task of bridging § 2's goal of not creating racial electoral quotas-which
would be unconstitutional-with its commitment to disrupt electoral sys-
tems that did not provide a protected group an equal opportunity "to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."' 50
The "Gingles preconditions" that emerged from the Court's opinion-
and which are nowhere present in the actual text of § 2-were the prod-
uct of the Court's effort to give a constitutional reading as well as practi-
cal effect to § 2.151 This approach has persisted across a series of § 2
145. Id. at 147-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("While the substantive reach of § 5 is
somewhat broader than that of the Fifteenth Amendment in at least one regard-the bur-
den of proof is shifted from discriminatee to discriminator-§ 5 is undoubtedly tied to the
standards of the Constitution. Thus, it is questionable whether'the 'purpose and effect'
language states anything more than the constitutional standard, and it is clear that the
'denying or abridging' phrase does no more than directly adopt the language of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.").
146. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986) (citations omitted).
147. See id. at 63.
148. See id. at 35, 43-46.
149. Id. at 66 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30 n.120 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
151. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-51 ("These circumstances are necessary preconditions for
multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives
of their choice for the following reasons. First, the minority group must be able to demon-
strate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district . . . . Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive . . . . Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate running unopposed, and usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate .... Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the majority's




cases. 152 Thus, in Holder v. Hall,153 black voters who challenged a
county's single-commissioner form of government as vote dilution under
§ 2 failed because the Court had no practical way of determining "where
the search for reasonable alternative benchmarks should begin" and
could not formulate "acceptable principles for deciding future cases."1 54
In Bartlett v. Strickland,155 the Court interpreted the first Gingles precon-
dition as requiring that the minority group in a remedial district under § 2
must constitute a voting-age majority to state a claim.156 The Court predi-
cated its decision on the need to preserve the framework of Gingles itself,
the need for "workable standards and sound judicial and legislative ad-
ministration," and the need to avoid "serious constitutional concerns
under the Equal Protection Clause."157 One need not agree with the
holding in Bartlett to identify the interpretive canons that it arguably
heeds.
The need (and desire) to construe § 2 in a manner that rendered it
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was apparent in a series of challenges to majority-black and major-
ity-Latino congressional districts in the 1990s.158 In those cases, the
defendant-states argued that the creation of these districts was based on
their compelling interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.159 The Court declined to give § 2 a construction that would run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause: "§ 2 does not require a State to create, on
predominantly racial lines, a district that is not 'reasonably compact.' If,
because of the dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably com-
pact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a
majority-minority district; if a reasonably compact district can be created,
nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district that is far from
compact." 160
The comparison of the interpretive approach of the Court across its
seminal post-Bolden § 2 cases to its interpretive approach in Shelby
152. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994).
153. 512 U.S. at 874.
154. Id. at 885.
155. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
156. Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Unlike any of the standards proposed to allow
crossover-district claims, the majority-minority rule relies on an objective, numerical test:
Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the relevant
geographic area? That rule provides straightforward guidance to courts and to those offi-
cials charged with drawing district lines to comply with § 2.").
157. Id. at 17, 21.
158. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74
(1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
159. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997
(1994).
160. Bush, 517 U.S. at 979.
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County yields a portrait of the Court striving to give constitutional and
practical effect to § 2 while doing precisely the opposite to H§ 4(b) and
5.161 However, there is simply no principled basis for the Court's canoni-
cal apostasies in Shelby County. We next turn to some important implica-
tions of Shelby County's unmoored and unorthodox interpretive
methodology.
II. IMPLICATIONS
The American judiciary serves as the ultimate arbiter in our system of
government in determining what the law is.16 2 This general statement of
mission reflects not only the court's preeminent role in interpreting con-
stitutional law, but it also applies (to a lesser degree) to its ability to give
meaning to ambiguous statutory language. In an era where federal regu-
lation and public law increasingly occupy the federal docket,163 the
court's interpretive authority gains greater significance in maintaining
and expanding important substantive rights. No longer is statutory inter-
pretation "an alien intruder in the house of common law;"'16 4 rather, this
analytical tool now accounts for a considerable share of the cases in the
federal court system. In other words, the district courts have become
"mechanisms for implementing statutes, and thus active participants in
our modern scheme of statutory governance."1 6 5
Signaling that the time has now passed for special administrative tools
like the preclearance remedy in voting rights, the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively set out on an interpretive path that directs the regulatory
scheme to curb or end discriminatory conduct toward traditional civil liti-
gation. In expressing skepticism about the necessity and effectiveness of
the preclearance system, the Court often asserts that there are political
harms and management burdens that the covered jurisdictions can no
longer afford. At the same time, the critique is also paired with an expres-
sion of (unwarranted) faith that the traditional means of vindicating con-
stitutional rights-the civil lawsuit-is plenty sufficient to assure the
political efficacy of racial minority groups.
161. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
163. See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1723 (2008) (presenting research showing the increase of class action lawsuits
in the federal courts).
164. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(1936) ("Happily the abrasive effect of the never-ending judicial labor of making a worka-
ble system of our law, so largely composed of statutes, is bringing about a more liberal
attitude on the part of the courts. Fortunately, too, law schools have begun to study and
investigate the problem involved in an adequate union of judge-made with statute law.
They are developing the underlying principles for its solution, which rest basically on a
more adequate recognition that a statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the com-
mon law, but a guest to be welcomed and made at home there as a new and powerful aid in
the accomplishment of its appointed task of accommodating the law to social needs.").
165. Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Rea-
son: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579, 579 (1992).
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In this section, we demonstrate why this line of reasoning from the
Court suffers from several flaws. First, it is completely blind to the histori-
cal experience that led to the adoption of the preclearance remedy in
1965 as well as the 2006 record findings in which Congress reconfirmed
the present advantages of a dual enforcement strategy-pairing
preclearance oversight with litigation. Second, the judicial optimism
about funneling the resources and energy of voting enforcement into liti-
gation alone is misleading and dangerous given this Court's procedural
holdings that curtail meaningful opportunities for civil plaintiffs (includ-
ing voting rights plaintiffs) to obtain relief. And third, eliminating the
preclearance remedy is all the more disturbing in light of how this move is
at odds with basic judicial policy. In short-circuiting the preclearance
remedy, the Court has turned the foundational anti-majoritarian principle
of the judiciary on its head. As the Court apparently views the concept,
judicial power is correctly marshaled to block rules that protect the mi-
nority-even where the majority has fashioned a rule to constrain itself
from interfering with the political rights of vulnerable minorities. We ad-
dress each of these matters in turn in the sections that follow.
A. AN UNWARRANTED Focus ON LITIGATION
In examining the most recent cases on Section 5, one finds the Court
sounding a strong note of mistrust about the administrative oversight
model of voting rights enforcement. 166 Aside from the selectivity of states
that is built into the system, Shelby County is equally as concerned with
the severe constraints on local governing authority that preclearance de-
mands. 167 In place of this purportedly burdensome limitation on state
sovereignty, the majority points to litigation as an effective alternative to
the special protections that preclearance provides.168 The Court's appar-
ent reasoning is that the civil lawsuit offers all the necessary means for
plaintiffs to vindicate their rights while avoiding the kinds of impediments
that prevent the state from crafting policies pursuant to its normal course
166. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) ("We do not accept the contention
that the State has a compelling interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates
the Justice Department issues."); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2003) ("While
courts and the Department of Justice should be vigilant in ensuring that States neither
reduce the effective exercise of the electoral franchise nor discriminate against minority
voters, the Voting Rights Act, as properly interpreted, should encourage the transition to a
society where race no longer matters. . .").
167. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) ("[D]espite the tradition
of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and several additional counties).
While one State waits months or years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted
law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect immediately, through the nor-
mal legislative process.") See also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009) ("It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that conditions
continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the Act imposes current burdens and
must be justified by current needs.")
168. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 ("Both the Federal Government and individu-
als have sued to enforce §2 and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to block
voting laws from going into effect, see 42 U. S. C. §1973j(d). Section 2 is permanent, ap-
plies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case.") (citation omitted).
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of business. Aside from the earlier point that this thinking is completely
antithetical to the historical circumstances that led Congress to enact § 5,
the assertion of equivalence between an administrative and litigation re-
gime rings rather hollow in light of the facts.
1. The Court's Idealized View of Litigation
Recent voting rights cases reflect the Court's strong preference for the
litigation form of civil remedy, and they follow a particular pattern of
thought. First, the Court accords major weight to the perceived costs as-
sociated with continuing the administrative review of the election changes
in covered states. Although the Shelby County court noted that there
were troubling federalism costs that burden the interests of state sover-
eignty (a topic that is never fully theorized in the opinion itself), there are
additional instances where the Court has voiced its grave concerns about
the costs of state and local jurisdictions trying to comply with the system.
In NAMUDNO, for example, the covered jurisdiction that brought the
lawsuit (a water utility district) asserted that the expenses of seeking fed-
eral review for election changes exceeded the jurisdiction's available fi-
nancial resources. 169 Even in the face of ample record evidence showing
that the costs of sending a filing to the federal government were quite
nominal,170 the Court characterized this process as a series of expensive
hurdles to policymaking choices that have little if any potential for race
discrimination. During his questioning at oral argument, for instance, Jus-
tice Kennedy voiced suspicions that the regulated states had spent a total
of more than a billion dollars over the last decade to meet the federal
filing mandates.171 With a price tag so large, the apparent costs of litiga-
tion would be far less onerous for most any local and state government to
bear.172
A similar concern about the preclearance system arises from the Court
in its expression of worry about the over-breadth of the remedy. The
Court has, in similar voting rights contexts, characterized states as gener-
ally "good actors" that operate in the best interests of racial minority
169. See Kareem U. Crayton, The Court's NAMUDNO Decision: Judging the Costs and
Efficiency of Preclearance, FINDLAW (May 26, 2009) http://writ.1p.findlaw.com/commen
tary/20090527_crayton.html.
170. Id. See also Brief for the States of N.C., Ariz., Cal., La., Miss. & N.Y. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Eric H. Holder, Jr., et al. in NAMUDNO v. Holder. No 08-322 (Mar.
5, 2009) at 9 http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/Court CasesOf_Interest/
1996.pdf ("Not only is the monetary cost to States in complying with Section 5 de minimis,
the intrusion on state sovereignty as a result of delay in implementing state election law
changes is also minimal.").
171. See Transcript. of Oral Argument. in NAMUDNO at 33 (Apr. 29, 2009) http:/
www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-322.pdf ("JUSTICE
KENNEDY: . . . [D]o you quarrel with the assessment-the testimony before the Senate





groups-along with every other member of the electorate.'73 In contrast
to the 1965-era South, when systematic defects in representation disad-
vantaged non-white groups, the norm for governance is quite different in
modern times. Thus, many of the § 4 jurisdictions today must engage in
time-consuming oversight that interferes with their efforts to work on be-
half of the entire electorate. Insofar as the preclearance system over-
predicts for race discrimination in the current era, several of the "good
actors" are saddled with administrative costs that are in fact both unnec-
essary and harmful.174 Put in the language of law and economics, the cur-
rent system of federal safeguards creates systemic inefficiencies that tend
to interfere with government decision-making.175
The implied advantage that civil litigation provides is that it allows for
a more efficient identification of bad actors. The jurisdictions most in
need of remediation essentially would self-select into the Court's desired
litigation-focused system, to the extent that a plaintiff seeks a voting
rights remedy with a legal claim that has merit. When plaintiffs take on
the responsibility for alerting the courts of illegal rules or practices and
for meeting the evidentiary burden of proof at trial, the regulatory arm of
the federal government avoids the kind of overreach that might meddle
with the local political process. Most of the policies and practices that are
typical to governance would raise no objections and therefore deserve no
close judicial scrutiny. The court's attention to voting rights, then, would
extend no further than the problems that Congress directs courts to con-
sider. Application of these legal standards would be national in scope
(avoiding the selectivity inherent in preclearance), but the weight of en-
forcement would be tailored to apply in the circumstances as they are
demonstrated to the court.
Third, the challenge to an administrative regime emanates from con-
cerns about the corrupting influence of ideological bias in Washington,
D.C. This line of thought asserts that the federal officials who commonly
review proposed changes are not applying the law impartially, but are
assessing the issues through a partisan lens that is improper in the en-
forcement of civil rights.176 The specific target of this critique is the work
173. See Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491, 504 (1992) ("in a real
sense every decision taken by government implicates voting. This is but the felicitous con-
sequence of democracy, in which power derives from the people. Yet no one would con-
tend that when Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act it meant to subject all or even
most decisions of government in covered jurisdictions to federal supervision.").
174. Ironically, the dissent in Shelby County made clear the irony that the "good ac-
tors" line of argument was ill-fitting for Shelby County, which was a jurisdiction that would
not easily evade virtually any version of the preclearance regime's targeting formula, based
on its own past violations of anti-discrimination law as well as that of the State of Alabama.
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (J. Ginsburg dissenting) ("Alabama's sorry history of
§ 2 violations alone provides sufficient justification for Congress' determination in 2006
that the State should remain subject to §5's preclearance requirement.")
175. See Kareem Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REv. 201
(2010).
176. Dan Eggen, Politics Alleged In Voting Cases, WASH. POsT (Jan. 23, 2006) http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/22/AR2006012200984.html; Dan
Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting As Illegal, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2005). http://
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done by the Department of Justice in reviewing preclearance changes.177
On questions about where (if anywhere) to apply the preclearance rem-
edy (the subject of Shelby County) or how to apply the substantive stan-
dard to a complex set of facts (Shaw v. Reno or Georgia v. Ashcroft),
articulating a consistent or uniform application of the remedy often defies
easy synthesis. The reason for this level of variance, some have argued, is
attributable to the partisan shifts in the White House and internal dis-
putes within the ranks of the Department of Justice.17 8 Put plainly, the
Democratic administrations have a different manner of interpreting the
federal law than those of Republicans. 179
The underlying critique on this point is that an adjudication-only re-
view process could develop a more uniform rule to address these dis-
putes. As a more neutral arbiter responsible for adjudicating these rights
in a litigation posture, the courts could produce a more predictable and
consistent set of governing principles. Only with the administrative exper-
tise and impartiality of the members of the judicial branch managing
these rules can one expect to have a set of rules and standards that are
predictable regardless of what party controls the White House.
2. Why Litigation and Elections Don't Mix
While there are undoubtedly some benefits of civil litigation, this ap-
proach alone cannot replace what is lost in the absence of a robust admin-
istrative oversight regime like the preclearance provision.o80 Aside from
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120101927.html; see
also Richard Hasen, Roberts' Iffy Support for Voting Rights, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005)
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/03/opinion/oe-hasen3 (recounting then-staffer John
Roberts' role in framing the Reagan Justice Department's position on the 1982 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act).
177. In the 2010 round of redistricting, preclearance states with Republican leadership
asserted their concerns that the Obama Justice Department would not favorably review
their mapping proposals due to partisan concerns. Accordingly, these states filed their pro-
posed changes simultaneously, with both the Justice Department and with the D.C. District
Court or (as in Texas) avoided the Justice Department review entirely. David G. Savage,
Justice Department Walks a Line on Political Redistricting, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011)
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/13/nation/la-na-justice-redistricting-20110814 ; Aaron
Blake, Texas Redistricting Case: Five Things You Need to Know, WASH. PosT (Dec. 13,
2011). http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/texas-redistricting-case-five-
things-you-need-to-know/2011/12/13/glQAdowHsO-blog.html.
178. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, U.S. Cites Race in Halting Law over Voter ID, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at Al (describing South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley 's outrage
over DOJ Objections to its voter identification law"); Hans von Spakovsky, Abusing the
Voting Rights Act, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 23, 2011) http://www.nationalreview.com/arti-
cles/260303/abusing-voting-rights-act-hans-von-spakovsky; Charles S. Bullock III & Ron-
ald K. Gaddie, What If the Courts Have to Handle Section 5 Reviews-Lots of them?, S.
POL. REP. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.southernpoliticalreport.com/storylink 39 1869.aspx
("Georgia's Democratic leadership feared that the Justice Department would not approve
the gerrymanders.").
179. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting
Rights Act Might Not Be So Bad After All, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 415 (2012) (outlining
and critiquing concerns about the role of partisanship in administrative review of
preclearance changes).
180. See generally, The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006). The point of this
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the well-traced concerns we have noted, there are also major limitations
inherent to election-related lawsuits that make the reliance on litigation
alone an incomplete strategy of maintaining voting rights protections.
They bear noting here because they represent the special burdens faced
by plaintiffs when they seek legal relief against states in this context. In-
deed, these are some of the same considerations that led Congress to de-
velop the preclearance system in 1965.
One of the most significant burdens associated with civil litigation in
the electoral context is the disadvantage of time. A jurisdiction's election
calendar does not simply slow or stop just because a lawsuit challenging a
law or policy has been filed. 81 Terms of office end and replacements
must be named to fill those vacancies; further, the machinery of qualify-
ing candidates, assigning election districts and running the polling places
rely upon actions and decisions that are months in advance of the actual
election. This unyielding timeline highlights an almost-universal truth for
election law scholars: the judiciary can be an especially slow and ineffec-
tive institution for settling election-related grievances in real time.182 The
worlds of politics and law, while overlapping, generally work on different
time frames. Trials and appeals in the judiciary can take years to com-
plete, and many of the underlying issues can become moot due to expired
terms of office or rapidly changed circumstances (you've heard the line
before: "A week is a long time in politics"). 8 3
A modern example of the way that election time can interfere with
litigation is legislative redistricting fights, which often can force courts to
contend with severe time-related pressures. The final resolution of a dis-
trict map can take a decade after the initial plan is adopted-just in time
for a new round of redistricting. Similar problems exist with legal efforts
to enjoin certain polling practices on Election Day: the voting may be
over before the court even hears the claim. In North Carolina's now well-
known Shaw v. Reno litigation,8^ the final approval of districts first chal-
lenged in 1991 did not happen until well after the year 2000-just in time
paper is not to suggest that civil litigation has no place at all in an enforcement regime of
voting rights. Rather, our point (which is reflected in the Congressional voting rights re-
enactment of 2006) is that absent preclearance, litigation alone is not equal to the task of
assuring opportunity to non-white voters that they can be equal participants in the political
process.
181. Kareem Crayton, What Powell v. McCormack Teaches Us About Contemporary
Race and Politics, SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:51 pm), http://www.scotusblog.coml
2010/02/what-powell-v-mccormack-teaches-us-about-contemporary-race-and-politics/.
182. Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act's Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives
and Views from the Field: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 13, 120-121 (2006).
183. See MEGAN LIEHS, A WEEK IS A LONG TIME IN POLITICS: HAROLD WILSON, THE
LABOUR PARTY, AND THE EUROPEAN QUESTION 1964-1975 (2011) (about the Prime Min-
ister who is credited with originating the oft-quoted maxim).
184. See North Carolina Redistricting Cases: the 1990s, Minn. Legislature, http://www
.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum/ncsum.htm (last updated July 8,
2003); Aleinikoff, T. Alexander & Issacharoff, Samuel, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1993).
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for a new redistricting process to commence.' 85 Courts will rarely succeed
in addressing live election disputes without clear, predictable standards
that guide when they should hear cases.
Second, one cannot easily devise a remedy to undo elections once they
have been conducted. Notwithstanding the court's ability to declare a vio-
lation of the law, there is little or no recourse following an election other
than to invoke a retrospective order that undoes the result. Aside from
the typical inertia or unwillingness of candidates to press such claims,186
the courts themselves are loath to engage. Because civil litigation views
the preliminary injunction as an extraordinary (and disfavored) equitable
remedy, 87 the only practical options available to litigants challenging a
completed election are prospective forms of relief. Once the proverbial
genie leaves the bottle, however, the effect of any remedy to govern fu-
ture elections is a rather hollow hope to offer a plaintiff who has success-
fully demonstrated a violation of the law.
Finally, the ebb and flow of civil litigation can sometimes conflate the
attention for the public's concerns with those of elected officials. At
times, the latter can eclipse the representational group interests of the
former. While these interests can align, this tension can prove a thorny
matter when they do not. This dynamic is not uncommon in election
cases, including Voting Rights Act challenges (when courts must decide if
black politicians have divergent political goals and preferences from
those of their constituents) or in partisan post-election challenges. Bush
v. Gore, of course, was a major case implicating the Court in the resolu-
tion of an election related disputeSR There, the strategic interests of the
Democratic and Republican nominees for President often displaced the
distinct substantive concerns of individual citizens in determining the
number of challenged counties where balloting was in dispute.189 Since
distilling these interests can be difficult, these divergent interests can
185. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237-38 (2001) (describing procedural his-
tory of Shaw litigation).
186. See Mark Braden, Disputed Elections Post Bush v. Gore: Are Federal Courts En-
tering the Political Contest Thicket? 4 (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working
Paper No. 17, April 16, 2011) ("Only a small percentage of recounts lead to formal contest
actions. The candidates who are the apparent losers usually are too physically, emotionally,
financially and politically exhausted. The "political sore loser" label is not easily shed. The
contestant always has the burden of proof and the regularity of election results is a strong
presumption to overcome, with judges commonly expressing their desire that the voters,
not themselves (judges) decide the elections. These factors combine to make actual elec-
tion contest actions rare in comparison to recounts.").
187. See Bethany Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard For Preliminary In-
junctions In Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1522, 1524-30 (2011) (reviewing the
evolution and variation of the preliminary injunction standard across circuits).
188. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Richard Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 393-96 (2001) (exploring concep-
tual challenges of applying an equal protection analysis to election related disputes).
189. William Marshall, Rough Justice, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 803 ("Unless any of
the political players were to rise above their own partisan interest, any decision resulting
from this chaos would necessarily reek of partisanship and self-dealing. And it was clear




sometimes result in a remedy that disserves an important stakeholder.190
B. CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE ROBERTS ERA
A second implication of Shelby County has to do with how relying on a
litigation-based model of enforcement would actually fare as a practical
matter in the current era. Taking the Court's recent cases on civil proce-
dure into account, the prospects are not especially bright. In addition to
the inherent limitations associated with civil rights cases involving voting
rights and elections, another more troubling factor is the general trend
that has made civil litigation less, not more, viable as a tool of enforce-
ment. In fact, the Roberts Court has quite methodically advanced new
regimes that constrain many of the traditional uses of civil litigation to
address structural reform. Plaintiffs today face important new hurdles to
pursuing (let alone winning) lawsuits in this context, making the decision
to relegate voting rights enforcement to traditional courtroom action a
rather cold comfort.
While there are several recent areas that one might use to illustrate this
trend, two of the Court's most recent and controversial rulings in the civil
procedure arena are most relevant for present purposes. They are the
Court's holdings relating to heightened pleading standards and the heav-
ier policing of court-invoked remedies.
1. Pleading
Until the Roberts era, most students of civil procedure would reso-
lutely offer the view that the standard of pleading found in Rule 8 is a
rather minimal one for plaintiffs to commence a legal action.191 All that is
needed is "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."192 The U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted
this requirement in Conley v. Gibson,'93 and held that a complaint should
not be dismissed unless it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."1 94
Under the classic way of thinking, a judge had a duty to credit even the
most basic complaint that gestured toward a more formalized legal claim.
Courts, at times, would in fact reinterpret the documents in order to
avoid dismissal of a claim based on lack of legal merit. The rationale be-
hind this interpretation was to maintain greater access to and participa-
tion in the court system, especially for those who could not afford legal
representation.
190. Kareem Crayton, What Powell v. McCormack Teaches Us About Contemporary
Race and Politics, SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:51 pm), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/02/what-powell-v-mccormack-teaches-us-about-contemporary-race-and-politics/.
191. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
193. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
194. Id. at 45-46.
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The Roberts Court set out on an entirely different path, announcing a
pair of major decisions that effectively shift the tide against plaintiffs by
imposing a higher burden on them to plead. Starting with the anti-trust
case in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 195 the Court reconsidered Con-
ley's plaintiff-friendly conception of pleading.196 The majority imposed a
new demand: that plaintiffs plead a set of plausible facts in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss. 197 Courts were directed to determine whether
the complaint included more than just a threadbare recitation of facts
that might possibly amount to misconduct, focusing instead on whether
the complaint's set of facts is plausible in light of judicial experience.198
The Court's later decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal'99 made clear that this new
pleading regime would apply to all civil litigation, since Conley's standard
was no longer tenable. 200
What this means for voting rights plaintiffs (as with all others) is that
the courthouse door is effectively narrowed. 201 Before one can even pur-
sue a lawsuit, the Court now demands greater knowledge and detail of
the harms that are at issue. Plaintiffs must engage in far more investiga-
tion in order to establish the knowledge or belief that the facts amount to
a violation of law.2 0 2 More to the point, plaintiffs effectively must con-
tend with a more frequently utilized and more powerful motion to dismiss
by defendants. Several studies already confirm the more frequent use of
the motion in civil cases. 203 And with the directive by the Roberts Court
to apply one's judicial experience, the predictability of these preliminary
motions has become more tenuous.
195. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
196. Id. at 562 ("[A] good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the
literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard." (citation omitted)).
197. Id. at 545 ("[S]tating a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter to
suggest an agreement. Asking for plausible grounds does not impose a probability require-
ment at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. The need at the pleading stage for
allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects Rule
8(a)(2)'s threshold requirement that the 'plain statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[w]
that the pleader is entitled to relief."').
198. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
199. Id. at 684.
200. Id. ("Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in anti-
trust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in
turn governs the pleading standard 'in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts.' Fed. Rule Civ. P. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for 'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.").
201. See Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v.
Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 299, 314-15 (2011).
202. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1296 (2010)
("Twombly's approach to pleading has been widely criticized as inconsistent with prior
Supreme Court decisions, contrary to the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
having destructive policy consequences in terms of litigants' access to the federal courts.").
203. Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State Claim After Iqbal 8
(2011); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on




At the other end of the civil litigation process is concern about legal
relief, which is another emerging challenge for plaintiffs in the Roberts
era. Obviously, relief is the main reason that plaintiffs commence a law-
suit and spend countless hours plodding through the process. Even where
the party that alleges an injury linked to discrimination manages to prove
their case, the possibility of obtaining meaningful and durable relief has
also been placed into greater doubt in this new era of decisions from the
Roberts Court. Whereas the courts previously enjoyed wide berth to es-
tablish equitable remedies that would respond to some of the most intrac-
table and systemic problems, the current era has viewed these efforts with
far less favor.
This trend is perhaps most apparent in cases involving individual chal-
lenges to state power. It was not that long ago that the Supreme Court
upheld a decision that endorsed the notion that courts were empowered
to rid the nation of race discrimination in the education sphere "root and
branch." 2 0 4 Similar statements were embraced in the Court's review of
special remedies devised by courts to address the unwillingness of state
governmental actors to apply non-discrimination principles in their hiring
practices.
While the Rehnquist era surely viewed these situations with some skep-
ticism, the Roberts Court has advanced that agenda with great alacrity.
The current court has very closely policed these remedial schemes, indi-
cated by both its outright distrust of judicial power and distaste for race-
conscious remedies. This includes instances where the local jurisdiction
intends to avoid race discrimination liability by reversing policies it views
as troublesome. In Ricci v. DeStefano,205 the Court resolutely stated that
the city government had erred in acceding to the demands of minority
parties to eliminate an employment qualification test that appeared to
impose a disparate burden on minority job applicants. 20 6 The Court de-
termined that it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to do so,
chiding the city for attempting to develop a solution that would avoid a
204. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("The objec-
tive today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segre-
gation. Segregation was the evil struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution. That was the violation sought to be corrected by
the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis for the holding in Green that school
authorities are 'clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch."') (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430,
437-38 (1968)).
205. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
206. Id. ("We conclude that race-based action like the City's in this case is impermissi-
ble under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that,
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute.
The respondents, we further determine, cannot meet that threshold standard. As a result,
the City's action in discarding the tests was a violation of Title VII.").
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costly and troublesome lawsuit.207 The Court faclted the city govern-
ment's racial concerns because they apparently clouded a rational judg-
ment that the proposed reform did not address an actual legal
problem. 208 Rather, they led to one.
Even in Section 5 related cases, the Court has been remarkably sparing
in latitude for judicial remedies even in those cases where intentional dis-
crimination was found. Such was the case in Perry v. Perez,209 where the
Court vacated a local trial court's imposition of a remedial plan that was
developed due to a preclearance violation.210 The Court found fault with
the plan because it was not tied to any established state policy and likely
the judges' own preferences. 211 The Court directed judges generally to
identify and preserve those parts of an invalidated state proposal that
were not infected by a finding of intentional discrimination; 212 appar-
ently, this was to be divined by determining whether a given aspect of the
plan would be subject to a preliminary injunction due to a possible
violation.
C. INVERTING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL POWER
The result of the Court's strong bias toward civil litigation in this con-
text offers a troubling report on the reach of the judicial policing power.
By rejecting a statutory provision that was resoundingly supported by a
majority in Congress, the Supreme Court has undermined one of the
most significant laws of the last century. Importantly, the point of the
provision is to assure those who have less power are not completely shut
out of the political process - the very anti-majoritarian concern that has
traditionally guided judicial intervention. Yet Shelby County represents
the work of five members to vindicate the perceived rights and interests
of a political majority that engineered these minority protections. While
Justice Scalia vainly attempted to explain this irony in oral argument by
dismissing Congress's reauthorization as the result of "perpetual racial
207. Id. at 581 ("[W]hen Congress codified the disparate-impact provision in 1991, it
made no exception to disparate-treatment liability for actions taken in a good-faith effort
to comply with the new, disparate-impact provision .... Allowing employers to violate the
disparate-treatment prohibition based on a mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liabil-
ity would encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact.").
208. Id. at 585.
209. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012).
210. Id. at 944 ("Because it is unclear whether the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas followed the appropriate standards in drawing interim maps for the 2012
Texas elections, the orders implementing those maps are vacated, and the cases are re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
211. Id. at 941 ("[T]he state plan serves as a starting point for the district court. It
provides important guidance that helps ensure that the district court appropriately confines
itself to drawing interim maps that comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act, without displacing legitimate state policy judgments with the court's own
preferences.").
212. Id. at 940-41 ("[T]he plan already in effect may give sufficient structure to the
court's endeavor. Where shifts in a State's population have been relatively small, a court
may need to make only minor or obvious adjustments to the State's existing districts in
order to devise an interim plan.").
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entitlement," 2 1 3 the more persuasive narrative is that this decision turns
the traditional principle in Carolene Products completely on its head.214
Put differently, this Court has inverted the traditional conception of its
anti-majoritarian role. Instead of tempering majority will in the defense
of the guaranteed rights of minorities, the Court now works to reinforce
majority entitlements even in the face of showings that document system-
ized minority disadvantage. The cold truth is that even where the major-
ity has taken its own steps to reform structures to benefit minorities, the
Court has defiantly responded by finding fault with such enactments-
using partially reasoned or entirely imagined harms to the majority itself.
Left completely out of this picture is any serious consideration, height-
ened or otherwise, to the plight of minorities that made the enactment a
necessity. Shelby County epitomizes this judicial pabulum and its assault
on Carolene Products. In the context of our nation's sordid racial history,
when a white majority is prepared to prophylactically constrain potential
racial bias in voting through a vehicle such as § 5, it is difficult to justify
judicial interference as anything other than the naked exercise of power
for its own sake. While few doubt that the voter registration and turnout
figures on which Justice Roberts trained so much attention in Shelby
County are significant indicators of racial progress, a majority populace
willing to check its own potential biases in voting trumps these indicators
by an order of magnitude and obviates judicial interference. Indeed, it is
only by virtue of the very democratic process that Shelby County thwarts
that the Court majority has any metrics of progress upon which to base its
determination that the coverage formula has outlived its usefulness. If,
however, Congress, as the representatives of a sovereign people, pos-
sessed the institutional competence to produce a degree of amelioration
in voting that even the Court itself had to take cognizance of, it is highly
unlikely that five justices of the Court know better than Congress how to
preserve and further such progress.
Reva Siegal has suggested that the bulk of the Supreme Court's recent
Equal Protection docket can be organized around a revised understand-
ing of the judiciary's empathy toward different groups.215 Whereas the
traditional view of equal protection doctrine sprang from the governmen-
tal concern with eliminating or reforming structural inequalities that had
213. See Transcript. of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (Feb. 27,
2013) http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/12-96.pdf;
("JUSTICE SCALIA: ... And this last [VRA] enactment, not a single vote in the Senate
against it. And the House is pretty much the same. Now, I don't think that's attributable to
the fact that it is so much clearer now that we need this. I think it is attributable, very likely
attributable, to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement. It's been
written about. Whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out
of them through the normal political processes.").
214. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 at n.4 (1938) ("There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legisla-
tion appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.") (citation omitted),
215. Reva Siegal, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013)
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disadvantaged certain marginalized groups, the current view has shifted
focus instead to alleged excesses of these policies.216 The attention has
now shifted to take account of those persons in society who have tradi-
tionally benefited from past group exclusion and who now must navigate
in a world that is informed by these reform policies. In a variety of con-
texts, from cases involving gender, to sexual orientation and (as in Shelby
County) race, protecting this generally favored group's entitlement to
equal regard under the law appears to be an overriding consideration for
the Court. It is this odd institutional concern with the perceived threats
and harms to traditionally empowered citizens that has developed a di-
vided doctrine of equality for the Court.
In her treatment of Shelby County, Siegal specifically notes the marked
contrast between the majority and the dissent's treatment of the same
history that produced the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Looking at identical
material in the Congressional record, the justices on either side of the
issue reached markedly contrasting conclusions. 217 Whereas the dissent-
ers led with their review of the well-documented Reconstruction and Jim
Crow experiences of Congress attempting to address Southern resistance
to black enfranchisement, the Chief Justice's opinion showed much more
regard for both the historic and current concerns of the states that had to
comply with the national law:
The majority was more concerned about the "disparate treatment" that
civil rights law inflicts on states than the disparate treatment that discrim-
ination inflicts on citizens. This concern led the majority to ignore long-
standing precedents on deference the Court owes to Congress in
reviewing an exercise of its power to enforce the provisions of the Recon-
struction Amendments. Instead, the Court took for itself a primary role
in determining whether Congress was justified in distinguishing among
states as the preclearance mechanisms of the Voting Rights Act did.2 1 8
Siegal notes the surprising extension of this state-centered reasoning,
which employs antiquated legal principles like "equal dignity" for pro-
positions that reach far beyond their intended usage. Yet the creative
treatment aids a much broader institutional purpose for the Roberts ma-
jority. Insofar as the constitutionally protected expression of policy pref-
erences within the states (presumably majority ones) encounter
interference from a federal regime (especially one with a questionable
shelf-life), the latter must yield to the former. The approach reifies the
notion of state sovereignty even in cases where the Reconstruction
Amendments and the Supremacy Clause would indicate that the opposite
conclusion is correct.
This theory explaining the Court's topsy-turvy approach to equal pro-
tection finds further support in work by Darren Hutchinson, who exam-
ines the judiciary's views about certain discrete and insular minority
216. Id. at 6.
217. Id. at 67-68.
218. Id. at 69.
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groups. 219 In his invitation for scholars and the judiciary to rethink equal
protection doctrine, Hutchinson notes the major problems with the view
in some theoretical camps that the LGBT community should be ex-
empted from the designation as discrete and insular.220 He laments the
extent to which the courts appear to embrace this thinking in the manner
in which they address equality cases involving sexual orientation. 221
Hutchinson finds that the misperception is rooted partly in the belief
that material definitions of power (e.g., education and financial re-
sources) are the traditional dimensions on which a court might assess a
group's leverage in the political system. Imposing this narrow legal defini-
tion of power in the context of the rights of gay and lesbian persons, how-
ever, is an unhelpful and misplaced application. Limited conceptions of
what constitutes those with power and those without it tend to overlook
the important ways that the majority population's animus works to un-
dermine the political effectiveness of groups. 222 In this particular context,
Hutchinson reminds that not only is the "materially powerful minority"
claim inaccurate in light of the facts about the LGBT community taken as
a whole, but it also works to unreasonably immunize certain majority po-
litical and legislative enactments meant specifically to curtail the enjoy-
ment of certain constitutional rights by this group. 223
For both Siegel and Hutchinson, the common bond is the finding that
the Court's current trajectory reflects a significant departure from settled
doctrine about how and when the judiciary should invoke its authority to
curb majority will. In Shelby County and other cases, reopening this dis-
cussion with a novel set of constitutional arguments has a clear effect. It
places the Court solidly in favor of showing greater respect for the con-
cerns of political majorities, groups that have rarely been denied or lim-
ited in their will in the political system. These cases demonstrate that the
Court has taken a markedly different path on equal protection in which
minority concerns rarely if ever predominate.
Departing from the traditional sense that judges should show sensitiv-
ity to policies aimed at improving the lot of discrete and insular groups,
Shelby County fails the test for the sound application of judicial enforce-
ment in two respects. Foremost, the Court ignores the well-known histori-
cal circumstances that led to Congress' imposition of the special rules to
defend against discrimination in voting in 1965. Even despite its massive
revisionism, the Court majority discounts the many concerns that made
federal intervention in state governmental structures necessary. The
move likely accounts for the Court's lack of attention to one of the ques-
219. Darren Hutchinson, Not Without Political Power: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Pro-
tection, and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238733.
220. Id.; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?, 85 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1358, 1372-83 (2000).
221. Hutchinson, supra note 219 at *21-23.
222. Id. at *25-33.
223. Id. at *56-59.
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tions presented in the case: Whether the federal law violated the Guaran-
tee Clause, a constitutional provision that grants protections not just to
states but ultimately to the people.
And by scrutinizing matters clearly within the power of Congress to
consider in legislation, the Court engages in the kind of judicial activism
that many of its conservative personnel decry. Perhaps the most surpris-
ing aspect of these decisions is how swiftly the Court has been willing to
supplant a decision taken by the legislature on policy. Shelby County, in
this respect, is far from a modest decision because it takes no account of
the fact that it upends a longstanding and bi-partisan piece of national
legislation due to its own concerns about issues that the legislative record
clearly addresses. By saving the legislative majority from itself, the Court
at once establishes its own power as paramount in the vindication of
rights. Sadly, that power seems inordinately limited to work to the advan-
tage of majorities.
III. RETURNING TO CONGRESS
In this section, we present a simple but effective proposal for a legisla-
tive response to the decision taken by the Court in Shelby County. Given
the above critique of the underlying reasoning in the decision, particu-
larly with respect to statutory interpretation, Congress would be well ad-
vised to respond with an enactment that simply makes its consideration of
the current conditions in the country more explicit. The approach that we
advocate provides the most justifiable update that shows loyalty to the
original basis for adopting and reauthorizing the preclearance remedy.
We next address the most recent effort by a bi-partisan group in Congress
to answer the Court's concerns differently. Pointing out various elements
of the alternative proposal, we show why this approach poses more
problems for preclearance than it resolves.
A. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Assume that in the immediate aftermath of passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 black voter registration and turnout increased dramat-
ically, which they in fact did.2 2 4 Assume further, though, that in response
to these increases, the originally covered § 5 jurisdictions implemented
photo voter identification requirements as a prerequisite to voting.
Whatever the arguments about the disparate impact of photo voter I.D.
today, in the 1960s with a less educated and poorer black population in
the South that had not yet been fully acculturated into the civic tradition
of voting, such requirements would likely have a racially disenfranchising
impact. If it seems that the heuristic is some fifty years ahead of itself,
that it precisely the point: The Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
224. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON & BERNARD GROFMAN, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE




Act of 1965 could not possibly foresee the use of voter I.D. laws as disen-
franchisement devices in 2014 any more than it could foresee the use of
myriad vote dilution schemes that § 5 would begin to address shortly after
passage of the Act. If, as the Shelby County majority seems to suggest,
Congress must "link[ ] coverage to the devices used to effectuate discrim-
ination and to the resulting disenfranchisement," 225 then one could easily
see how the Voting Rights Act would have been a dead letter soon after
its passage unless Congress was willing to revise the coverage formula
each time a covered jurisdiction (or a non-covered jurisdiction) engaged
in a disenfranchising scheme not mentioned in the coverage formula.
The absurdity of this approach is apparent. We suspect that the majori-
ties in Austin and Shelby County never gave an example (or even a clear
indication) of what would be an acceptable coverage formula because
they failed to extrapolate the consequences of the broad pronouncements
in those cases. The threat that this kind of theoretical musing by the judi-
cial branch poses to the legitimate exercise of congressional and execu-
tive branch authority should not be underestimated. While the Shelby
County majority complained that Congress's coverage formula in § 4(b)
was stale-dated, the Court itself routinely relies on stale-dated informa-
tion in applying a basic judge-made constitutional precept: one person,
one vote. "States operate under the legal fiction that their plans are con-
stitutionally apportioned throughout the decade, a presumption that is
necessary to avoid constant redistricting, with accompanying costs and
instability." 2 2 6 Indeed, many prophylactic judicial tests applicable to
politics could easily be immobilized if the Court held itself to the same
standard as its language in Shelby County suggests it is willing to apply to
Congress. Regardless of one's political ideology, members of Congress
have an interest in ensuring that the judicial branch does not impose on it
a requirement of precision that the Court itself is unable to meet in the
most universally accepted non-discrimination principle of voting: one-
person, one-vote.
What is particularly vexing about the Shelby County majority's facile-
ness in invalidating the coverage formula is that in the highly relevant
context of redistricting-relevant because minority vote dilution is often
perpetrated during this process-certain members of the majority have
found that the Constitution's express commitment of a subject to Con-
gress's authority is a salient consideration in the judiciary's abstention.
Thus, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,227 Justice Scalia and three other justices em-
phasized that the remedy to political gerrymanders rested with Congress
and its power under § 4 of Article I of the Constitution (the Elections
Clause) to regulate congressional redistricting.228 More importantly,
225. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013).
226. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 421 (2006).
227. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
228. Id. at 285 ("The Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political entities,




these justices would have found all partisan gerrymandering claims non-
justiciable because of the lack of judicially manageable standards by
which to judge such claims.229 Our point here is not to argue that the
Court had no business ruling on the merits in Shelby County. But if the
manageability of a legal standard is relevant to whether the Court should
entertain a claim at all, then the Court should take care not to impose
unclear constitutional standards on Congress when it is acting pursuant to
a power that the Constitution expressly grants it in § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. As important, in writing for the four-justice bloc supporting
nonjusticiability in Vieth, Justice Scalia argued that the political process is
rife with imponderables that make it difficult to know when a political
party is a majority party entitling it to a majority of congressional seats
from a given state, and even if it could, how durable partisan affiliations
would be from one election to the next or one political office to the
next.23 0 The complexity that Justice Scalia identifies in the partisan gerry-
mandering context, which is deployed as a reason for the Court to ab-
stain, is surely present in the decision about what coverage formula is
most suitable to achieve Congress's goal of eliminating discrimination in
voting. Thus, Congress-having a more-than-15,000-page record 231
before it and greater institutional capacity in the subject area generally-
is entitled to deference.
These separation-of-powers concerns, as well as the current reality of
gridlock in Congress, lead us to conclude that the most expeditious con-
gressional response to the Court's decision in Shelby County is, in es-
sence, to tell the Court,
You misunderstood the coverage formula. It was not meant to be inter-
preted or operate in isolation from (1) the ability of covered jurisdictions
to bail out under Section 4(a) based on current conditions in those juris-
dictions; (2) the ability of non-covered jurisdictions to be bailed in if they
are found guilty of intentionally discriminating against minority voters;
and (3) the nationwide operation of Section 2 to combat discrimination in
jurisdictions that are not covered by Section 5 or eligible for bail in under
Section 3. We have determined that this regime identifies the areas of the
country in which voting discrimination is most persistent and most likely
to occur, while at the same time addressing federalism concerns through
the availability of bail out, bail in, and the nationwide application of Sec-
tion 2. Thus, we reaffirm the congressional record on which the 2006
reauthorization was based, and we expressly inform the Court that our
decision to employ the existing coverage formula is based and remains
based on that record.
229. Id. at 281 ("[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that politi-
cal gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.").
230. Id. at 286-87, 290.
231. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D.D.C. 2011), affd, 679 F.3d 848(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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Under this approach, the coverage formula of § 4(b) would be slightly
revised to read as follows: "This section [§ 4(b)] shall apply to all jurisdic-
tions currently covered by Section 5 or bailed in pursuant to Section 3
that do not qualify for bailout under Section 4(a)." This proposal has the
benefit of simplicity and would obviate having to establish an entirely
new, extensive congressional record to support a revised § 5.
B. WHAT IS MISSING FROM THE CONGRESS'S PROPOSED ANSWER
Earlier this year, members of Congress announced their proposed leg-
islative response to the problem presented by the holding in Shelby
County.232 House Bill 3899, sponsored by House Judiciary Committee
Chair James Sensenbrenner, lays out a series of technical adjustments in
the VRA that intend, among other things, to reduce or eliminate some of
the existing litigation burdens for plaintiffs seeking to address election
problems.233 However, the principal focus of the set of amendments to
the law is to revive the preclearance targeting formula - albeit using dif-
ferent criteria.
To show that current political conditions direct Section 4's targets for
administrative oversight, Chairman Sensenbrenner has proposed to trans-
form the formula from making a "snap shot" assessment of a jurisdic-
tion's eligibility (based on the conditions as they existed in 1965) to a
rolling review of various political conditions in the entire country. Instead
of determining preclearance coverage using a moment in time, the envi-
sioned formula reconsiders the necessity for a given jurisdiction's cover-
age afresh each year. The apparent advantage of this revised approach is
that federal review would depend upon standard criteria that are updated
with the results of each election cycle. The main variable that drives eligi-
bility in the targeting formula's analysis is the number of preclearance
violations that occurred within the jurisdiction during the last fifteen
years.234
In addition to the compliance element, the proposed formula also es-
tablishes a jurisdiction's eligibility based upon its especially low levels of
minority turnout in a series of elections. 235 Distinct from the pre-Shelby
County approach, the proposed targeting formula expands the analysis
for eligibility in two distinct ways. First, the election cycle under review
extends from just the data from a single year (as the original formula
relies on 1964 returns) to national elections in each election cycle.
Aside from the longitudinal extension, the relevant election data would
be broadened to consider not just national races but also state and local
contests as well. To the extent there is evidence of depressed minority
participation at any level of government, the bill captures places where it
232. Dustin Volz & Jack Fitzpatrick, New Voting Rights Act Rewrite Would Revive Fed-
eral Oversight for Only Four States, NAT'L. J. (Jan. 16, 2014).
233. H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014); see also S. 1945, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
234. H.R. 3899.
235. Id. at § 3(b)(4)(B)(i),(ii).
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exists based on several lines of comparison. Further, the relevant baseline
figure, against which sub-par minority turnout can be established, varies
based upon the context. Relevant measures can include the national aver-
age for minorities, the statewide rate for white voters, or (in the case of a
smaller jurisdiction) the local rates for white voters.
As suggested above, the intent behind this overhauled formula is to
accomplish two different goals: one that is legal and the other practical.
On the legal dimension, proponents claim that the revamped formula sat-
isfies the Supreme Court's demand for a rational "fit" between the under-
lying evidence of current problems and the scope of preclearance
coverage. To justify its renewed formula, Congress has derived character-
istics to distinguish the places where the special remedy operates from the
rest of the country. The presumably tighter nexus between the current
data and the updated application of the remedy make a stronger case that
the provision will survive judicial scrutiny. Insofar as the entire country
would be theoretically subject to the provision based on their compliance
with certain criteria (now or in the future), the selectivity concerns ex-
pressed in Shelby County are far less salient.
The practical consideration that speaks in favor of the plan is the neces-
sity of obtaining bipartisan support for the bill. One of the singular
strengths of the Voting Rights Act is that it has remained one of the few
laws that members of Congress join across the aisle to support. Some
commentators count this law among America's so-called "super statutes,"
whose symbolic significance eclipses the typical enactment. 236 Such laws
command the utmost respect because they reflect settled (quasi-constitu-
tional) understandings. They therefore should not change without a tre-
mendous amount of legislative consideration. Each time the Voting
Rights Act has been amended, Republicans and Democrats fashioned im-
portant compromises to smooth the rougher edges of their differences
about the law. To maintain the national support for the VRA, any reor-
ganization would need endorsements from a cross section of the coun-
try-including its different racial, partisan, and regional segments.
While the legislative effort to address the conceptual puzzle that Shelby
County poses is laudable, several thorny issues remain regarding the por-
tion of the administrative remedy that has been left in place. The note-
worthy omissions from this new proposal tell at least as important a story
about the gaps in the law as the new features that have been proposed. A
brief review here helps to illustrate the ways that the proposed fix may
create more problems for voting rights enforcement than it resolves. In
fact, the provision appears to concede much of what those who have
sought to protect preclearance were hoping to preserve.
The first glaring omission from this replacement regime in the bill is the
narrowed focus of the kinds of election "changes" that are eligible for
preclearance review. Perhaps in an effort to persuade the conservative
236. See William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, SuperStatutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
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members of Congress to accept the new proposal, the bill's sponsors have
agreed to exempt any new state voter identification laws from the policies
that can be reviewed by federal authorities.237 According to the thinking,
these qualification laws are enacted with a variety of purposes in mind,
not all of them racial discrimination. And insofar as the Supreme Court
has approved of these provisions in principle as a valid method of pro-
tecting against voting fraud,238 imposing a burden on states to justify
these statutes is constitutionally questionable and practically untenable in
a new formula.
The second matter that defies logic is the rolling review that is embed-
ded in this formula. This approach appears to meet the Court's challenge
to use current data to demonstrate the need for coverage, yet the effect of
this particular revision goes so far as to undermine a core function of
preclearance. Congress ignored the ingenious design in the original enact-
ment - it assures the prolonged compliance of states and, over time, a
likely "transformation" of the targeted jurisdictions with respect to racial
discrimination.239 Compliance was regarded as necessary through the life
of the law, barring a special bailout provision that allows the state to
demonstrate that it had embraced the core principles of preclearance - to
avoid practices and policies that leave non-white voters in a worse posi-
tion compared to the status quo. The underlying incentive for the state
was to engage in fair treatment when it drafted new policy, with the ex-
pectation that it would continue to do so in the absence of immediate
review.
By reverting to a more temporary application, the proposed revision
falls short of this long term compliance aspiration in two different ways.
First, the proposal would only apply federal review to future changes in
state election policy. The prospective orientation effectively grandfathers
any of the laws adopted by states during the period between the court's
suspension of targeting formula in Shelby County and any later Congres-
sional adoption of a new statutory formula. States like Texas and North
Carolina that swept through restrictive voting laws without serious con-
cern for the negative consequences on minority groups would be re-
warded for their action. With these harmful changes already in place as
the basis of comparison, few new proposals could possibly make things
worse politically for minorities. In other words, the effective bite of
preclearance would be reduced substantially. One might well have de-
signed a formula to direct attention to how states behaved during this
period, but that consideration is noticeably absent from the proposal. Un-
doubtedly, this omission shores up support among some conservative leg-
islators with misgivings about federal oversight. But it leaves serious
questions for all of those who view the point of preclearance as prevent-
ing such laws from taking effect.
237. See H.R. 3899 § 2.
238. See Crawford v. Marion County, 433 U.S. 181 (2008).
239. See Crayton, supra note 175.
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A more specific way that this design falls short is that the review re-
gime does not last for a reasonable length of time. Indeed, the application
of coverage in this new regime is scattershot. The bill's sponsors have
perhaps unknowingly endorsed the "penalty box" analogy that Southern
states developed in 1965 to criticize the statute. The rolling review feature
in the bill makes preclearance more of a respite from discrimination than
a reform of a system. According to most estimates, Mississippi (with six
violations in the last fifteen years) would remain part of the preclearance
system for only two years - unless it commits a new violation.240 With
such a clear end in sight, preclearance would have little if any transforma-
tive effect on local authorities. A jurisdiction that is committed to adopt-
ing a discriminatory policy (that would otherwise be denied in
preclearance) could simply evade the statute's aims by delaying passage
of the law until its brief time in the penalty box expires. There is thus very
little incentive in these communities to work toward compromises that
engage the concerns of racial minority groups. Without even a follow-up
probationary period to assure compliance, nothing would stop state
lawmakers from utilizing the advantages of time and inertia that the origi-
nal provision explicitly sought to curtail.
Finally, and perhaps most striking, are the omissions in the geographic
reach of the revised formula. It is noteworthy that the proposal does not
initially designate any new targeted state that was not included in the pre-
Shelby County system. If indeed the Court was concerned that states
outside of the South might be similar to states targeted in 1965, this new
formula seems to suggest otherwise. But other omissions are even more
surprising. While Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana remain part of the
system, the formula would seem to omit the Heart of Dixie. Alabama, the
state whose sustained resistance to black enfranchisement spurred the
need for the original Voting Rights Act 1965, somehow eludes coverage
under the revamped formula.241 The same state is home to Shelby
County, the titular jurisdiction in the challenge that led to the dismantling
of Section 5. The ironies of this stunning omission abound. During oral
argument in Shelby County, the Supreme Court repeatedly was reminded
that Alabama would not be eligible for bailout under the original system
because of its misconduct in the review process. On the factual record
that Congress itself developed in the 2006 reauthorization, there was am-
ple testimony from Alabama showing how the current environment
works to undermine or dilute the voting power of African American vot-
ers and others.
In essence, the proposed formula actually deepens the very same con-
cerns that the Chief Justice noted in his account of Section 4 in Shelby
240. Carroll Rhodes, The Harmful Effects of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
2014 (H.R. 2899 and S. 1995, 113th Congress) on Minority Voters in Mississippi (Feb. 17,
2014) at 7.
241. See National Conference of State Legislatures, H.R. 3899 Voting Rights Amend-




County. Alabama is, in many ways, far more analogous as a jurisdiction to
Mississippi than Massachusetts is.24 2 Yet the logic in the proposed bill is
to place these two states in the Deep South (with very similar historical
and political trajectories with respect voter enfranchisement) into differ-
ent categories - one that demands the sustained federal review and the
other that has substantially reformed so that such review is no longer
necessary. The reasoned distinctions that exist between these two states
are difficult if not impossible to identify. One would be hard pressed to
argue that the situation for racial minorities in Alabama is materially
more improved than for racial minorities in Mississippi. However, the
structure and application of the proposed reform of Section 4 require one
to make that assertion. Indeed, the claim fails to pass the risibility test.
The point of this critique is simply to suggest the following obvious point:
In pursuit of the goal of complying with an otherwise nonsensical decision
by the Supreme Court in Shelby County, the Congress has developed a
provision that neither offers an internal logic nor a practically meaningful
application. Put plainly, an otherwise neutral formula that serves an im-
portant societal purpose has been refashioned by Congress to become
less rational and effective, not moreso.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated how the Shelby County decision departs
wholly from the established method of statutory interpretation that is
represented in the Court's handling of a more politically contested and
publicly controversial national policy. In ways that are difficult to square
with the majority's strained efforts to locate a rationale to uphold the
provisions of Obamacare, the same majority of justices could find no ba-
sis whatsoever on which to justify a provision of law that has been rightly
described as the crown jewel of the civil rights movement. As this paper
has pointed out, such interpretive moves were readily available; however,
Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues in the majority were not inclined
to consider them in light of the palpable skepticism they have held for the
statute.
Although the Court's departure in Shelby County from its recent
health care case is disappointing, what is roundly disturbing is how starkly
different this voting rights case is from those where the Court rather con-
sistently has viewed the VRA in light of Congressional intentions over
the last four decades. Shelby County's rather limited, disjointed, and un-
duly narrow conception of the statutory formula is wholly misplaced in
light of the bulk of the precedent that has informed how both the judici-
ary and Congress itself viewed the statute.
242. See Brief of Political Sci. and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents at 6, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
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